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INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS AS PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY IN
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
YOUNGJAE LEEt
This Article is about the epistemic significance of internationalconsensus
on constitutional interpretation in the Eighth Amendment context. First, this
Article examines whether meaningful conclusions about one's desert judgments
can be reached through a process of interjurisdictionalcomparison thatfocuses
on the existence of a consensus on the question of what punishment is appropriatefor what crimes and criminals. Second, this Article examines the relevance of internationalconsensus on penal practices by analogizingthe consensus to three different types of consensus: scientific, aesthetic, and moral. This
Article concludes from this discussion that so long as the Supreme Court stays
with what this Article calls the "norm-centric analysis" in consultingforeign
sources, the existence of an internationalconsensus on a penal practice should
not lead us to lean one way or the other about its constitutionality under the
Eighth Amendment. This Article then argues that the Court, given its judicial
minimalist tendencies, is unlikely to go beyond its norm-centric mode of analysis and also that abandoningthe norm-centricanalysis would counsel against
consulting types of foreign legal materials, such as internationalhuman rights
treaties, that do not reveal reasons behind the norms that they endorse. This
Article ends by exploring both broader implications and limits of arguments
made in this Articlefor the judicialborrowingdebate.
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INTRODUCTION

After the Supreme Court declared the juvenile death penalty unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of
the Eighth Amendment' in Roper v. Simmons,2 one aspect of the decision has dominated the scholarly commentary on Roper: the Court's
partial reliance on prevailing international norms and practices of
foreign countries. The debate over the relevance of comparative and
international legal materials to constitutional interpretation is not
new,4 but it has intensified in recent years after the Court's citations of
I The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
2 543 U.S. 551
(2005).
3 See, e.g.,
Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International
Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl,
The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practiceand the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our
International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 77-80 (2006); Robert J. Delahunty &
John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 291 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARv. L. REV. 109
(2005);Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV.
129 (2005); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005);
Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the DenominatorProblem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005).
4 See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (ScaliaJ.,
dissenting) ("The plurality's reliance upon Amnesty International's account of what it pronounces to be civilized standards of decency in other countries ... is totally inappro-
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foreign sources in such high-profile and controversial cases as Roper,
Lawrence v. Texas,5 and Atkins v. Virginia.6 Justices disagree with each
other sharply on this issue both in judicial opinions 7 and in other public fora, s and similar debates took place during the confirmation hearings of Chief Justice John Roberts" and Justice Samuel Alito 0 and in
measures introduced in Congress to condemn the practice of citing
foreign laws."
The size of academic literature on the relevance of foreign laws
question
has quickly grown in the past several years and continues to
12
grow. Most of these commentaries, generally from international law

priate as a means of establishing the fundamental beliefL of this Nation.... We must
never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding."); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 145-70 (1991).
5 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003).
6

536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).

7 See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 604-05 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting); Lawrence,
539 U.S. at

598 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari); Atkins, 536 U.S at 324-25 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
8 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court, "A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 1, 2005), in 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 351 (2005); Sandra Day O'Connor, Asso. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address Before the Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law (Mar. 16, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
348 (2002); The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. ConstitutionalCases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Bryer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519
(2005) [hereinafter Scalia-Breyer Conversation]; Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, Keynote Address Before
the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr.
2, 2004), in 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 305 (2004).
9 Confirmation Hearingon the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts,Jr. To Be ChiefJustice of
the
United States Before the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, 109th Cong. 199-201, 292-93 (2005).
10 Confirmation Hearingon the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an
AssociateJustice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary,109th Cong.

370-71, 470-72 (2005).

l1 See, e.g., H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005).
12 See sources cited supra note 3; see also Matthew D. Adler, Commentary,
Can Con-

stitutional Borrowing Be Justified?: A Comment on Tushnet, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350
(1998); Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for ConstitutionalComparativism, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 639 (2005); Diane Marie Amann, "Raise the lag and Let It Talk". On the Use of
External Norms in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 2 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 597 (2004); Steven
G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill": American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's
Practiceof Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335 (2006); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search ofJustfication: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation,
74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); Martin S. Flaherty, Separation of Powers in a Global Context, in
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or constitutional law scholars, tend to be top-down. They explore the
question of whether foreign or international laws should be relevant
to constitutional interpretation as a general theoretical matter, starting either from theories of constitutional interpretation or from debates about the domestic legal status of international laws, and then
apply such general considerations to specific contexts like the Eighth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment.
Much insight has been gained from this academic literature. For
instance, the debate over whether the practice of citing foreign laws is
a recent doctrinal invention or something that has always been with us
is over. The practice is not new; it is indisputable that the Court has
engaged with foreign sources in the past. 1 Next, it is also an undeniable fact that judges from all over the world are talking to each other
on common issues, sometimes through opinions, sometimes in international courts and tribunals, and other times in more informal venues, such as seminars and conferences. 14 The normative significance
of such transnational dialogues may be in dispute, but no one can
deny that such dialogues are increasingly common. As to the debate
over whether the Court is treating foreign laws as "binding" or "au-

JUDGES, TRANSITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF STEPHEN

LIVINGSTON (John Morrison & Colin Harvey, eds., forthcoming 2006); David Fontana,
Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001); Sarah K.
Harding, ComparativeReasoning andJudicialReview, 28 YALEJ. INT'L L. 409 (2003); Ran
Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in ComparativeConstitutionalLaw, 53 AM. J. COMP.
L. 125 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, TransnationalDiscourse,Relational Authority, and the US.
Court: Gender Equality, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 271 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (2004); Joan L. Larsen, Importing
ConstitutionalNorms from a "Wider Civilization": Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court's Use of
Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. LJ.
1283 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution:
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 353 (2004); Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses ofInternationalLaw in ConstitutionalInterpretation,98 AM.J. INT'L L. 82 (2004); Eric A. Posner &
Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REv. 131 (2006); Michael D. Ramsey, InternationalMaterials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98
AM.J. INT'L L. 69 (2004);Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent
Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Carlos F.
Ronsenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law, I INT'L
J. CONST. L. 269 (2003); Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 13 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (2006); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof
ComparativeConstitutionalLaw, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999); Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better Than Knowing More?, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1275 (2006) [hereinafter Tushnet,
Knowing Less]; Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF.,
July-Aug. 2004, at 40.
13 See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 3, at 756;
Cleveland, supra note 3.
14 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65-103 (2004);
Anne-Marie
Slaughter, JudicialGlobalization, 40 VA.J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000).
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thoritative," or merely "persuasive," "instructive," or "confirmatory," it
seems that we are at a standstill. This particular debate is like two
ships passing each other at night. One side accuses the Court of giving up our sovereignty; the other side simply denies it with a shrug, as
if wondering why anyone would ever think such a silly thing.15
We have reached a point in the debate where no further advance
seems likely so long as we continue to speak in general terms about
the desirability of citing foreign laws. This Article thus proceeds in
the opposite direction with a new focus. Instead of going top-down
from theories of international law or constitutional interpretation to
an interpretive claim about the Eighth Amendment, this Article starts
at the opposite end-the Eighth Amendment-and works toward the
issue of the relevance of comparative and international materials in
constitutional interpretation. In other words, this Article takes as its
starting point the question Roper asked-whether the juvenile death
penalty is unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause of the Eighth Amendment-and then asks whether the practice of looking overseas can illuminate the juvenile death penalty issue
and, through extension where appropriate, other domestic constitutional issues. And in doing so, this Article focuses in particular on the
significance of international consensus as persuasive authority in the
Eighth Amendment. If, as the Roper Court stated, "the United States
is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction
to the juvenile death penalty,"' 6 should such an international consensus carry any persuasive weight in judging whether the juvenile death
penalty is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment?
This Article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom held by
several Supreme CourtJustices and many legal scholars, the answer to
this question is no. In understanding this claim, however, it is important to be clear that the key concept here is that of persuasivenessor instructiveness. One of the reasons why much of the current debate over
the question of judicial borrowing of foreign laws has the flavor of
people talking past each other is that there is no agreement on what is
to be justified or criticized. For instance, foreign authorities may be
thought to be binding, the way Supreme Court precedent is binding
on lower courts. Almost nobody defends this view. Or, foreign au-

15 Compare, e.g., Young, supra note 3, at 151-56 (criticizing the Court for treating
foreign legal sources as "authoritative," despite its assertions to the contrary), with
Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 12, at 1286-87 (dismissing sovereignty concerns).
16

543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
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thorities may be thought to be relevant. But "relevance" is a concept
that confuses more than illuminates, as it occupies the large area between "dispositive" and "worth mentioning." 17 A quote from a Shakespeare play may sometimes be "relevant" in ajudicial opinion in some
weak, uncontroversial sense. Afortiori, no one can deny the relevance
of foreign legal materials that seem to address the issue at hand, if
"relevance" is defined weakly enough. Much time is wasted in the judicial borrowing debate because opponents attack the view that almost nobody defends ("binding"), and proponents respond by defending the view that nobody attacks ("relevant"). 1 8
A further difficulty here is that we cannot theorize about the
proper relationship between domestic constitutional law and international norms without agreeing on an account of the relevant domestic
doctrine in the first place. For instance, if it is the case that the meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause can be ascertained
by referring to what practices were considered cruel and unusual by
founders at the time the Clause was enacted, then the question of
whether current foreign sentiments are relevant to constitutional interpretation is of course beside the point. Or, if it is the case that the
Clause asks only a question of, say, cost-effectiveness in administration
of the criminal justice system, then it obviously makes sense to see
whether other countries have come up with less costly or harsh ways of

17

In evidence law, because of the flexibility of the term "relevance," the concept

of "probative value" is used to give "relevance" more shape. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403
(defining "relevant evidence" as that having the tendency to make any consequential
fact "more probable or less probable" but allowing its exclusion if its "probative value"
is outweighed by prejudice).
18 For an example arguing against the "binding" view, see Posner, supra note 12, at
42 ("I think most Americans would think it outrageous that Zimbabwean judges, however distinguished they may be, were making law for us."). Justice Ginsburg, on the
other hand, has defended the "relevant" view:
Judges in the United States are free to consult all manner of commentary, restatements, treatises, what law professors or even law students write copiously
in law reviews, for example. If we can consult those writings, why not the
analysis of a question similar to the one we confront contained in an opinion
of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Constitutional Court of South Africa,
the German Constitutional Court, or the European Court of Human Rights?
Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 354.
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combating crime. 9 These are not, however, the ways in which the
Eighth Amendment is commonly understood.20
More plausibly, if the correct understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is to conform to prevailing international
norms because the Clause calls for disfavoring "unusual" punishments, then of course it is the case that foreign sources must be taken
into account in interpreting the provision. Foreign laws, used this
way, do not act as binding precedent but rather partially constitute the
substance of the Eighth Amendment itself. Some have defended the
use of foreign legal materials in the Eighth Amendment context precisely on this basis. 2' Regardless of the merits of this reading of the
Eighth Amendment, this type of argument can further obscure the
judicial borrowing debate as it blurs the distinction between the idea
that foreign laws are helpful or instructive in interpreting our law and

19 See Larsen, supra note 12, at 1289-91 (arguing that
"empirical" uses of comparative and international law are unproblematic).
20 We have moved far beyond the point at which we believe that the
Eighth
Amendment bans only concrete historical practices that were considered "cruel and
unusual" at the time of the Amendment's ratification. It is far more plausible, and far
less radical, to read the Eighth Amendment as "draw[ing] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). As to the cost-effectiveness argument, as Judge Posner once
remarked in an article defending the use of economics in interpreting the Constitution, "the Eighth Amendment has no clear economic interpretation." Richard A. Posner, The Constitutionas an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 4, 38 (1987).
21 The reasoning for such an argument is that

[t]o decide whether a particular punishment is "unusual" necessitates comparison of the particular facts at issue to some generalized practice....
[W]hat is the appropriate frame of reference for the comparison? Ought the
referent be juries in a particular locality, states in the federal union or the
community of nations? ... Although [this] question commands no obvious
answer, the broadest framework, the world community, is as logical as any
other.
Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual"Punishment: The Domestic Effects of InternationalNorms Restrictingthe Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 655, 688 (1983) (footnote
omitted); see also Harold Hongju Koh, The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12
TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 9 (2004) ("[I]f we are the only country that executes persons with mental retardation[,] that practice is unusual And remember, the 8th
Amendment to the United States Constitution specifically bans 'cruel and unusual
punishments."'). The phrase "evolving standards of decency" has inspired similar arguments. Justice Blackmun, for instance, once wrote, "If the substance of the Eighth
Amendment is to turn on the 'evolving standards of decency' of the civilized world,
there can be no justification for limiting judicial inquiry to the opinions of the United
States." Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39,
48 (1994).
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the idea that foreign laws are constitutive in that they at least partially
determine what our law is through incorporation.
This Article focuses on the question of whether international consensus should be treated as persuasive in the Eighth Amendment context and does not address the questions of whether it should be considered binding or constitutive. The reason I focus on the question of
persuasiveness is that the practice
of citing foreign authorities is most
S22
often defended on that basis -perhaps because it is commonly believed that the argument that foreign authorities can be persuasive,
unlike the argument that foreign authorities may bind American
judges or constitute American constitutional law, avoids the charge
that citing foreign authorities undermines sovereignty.
Another reason it is useful to focus on the idea of persuasiveness is
that framing the issue this way forecloses, at the outset, the common

22

Various Supreme CourtJustices, while quick to deny that foreign authorities are

binding, have defended the practice on the grounds that foreign sources can be helpful, instructive, or persuasive. In Roper, for instance, Justice Kennedy stressed that the
foreign practices he was citing in his opinion were "not... controlling" and insisted
that "the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility."
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). He further stated that the "opinion of
the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and
significant confirmation for our own conclusions." Id. at 578. Justice Ginsburg, too,
stated in a speech that "[f1oreign opinions are not authoritative" and that "they set no
binding precedent for the U.S. judge." Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 353. Rather, the reason to look at foreign sources, Justice Ginsburg added, is "to learn what we can from
the experience and good thinking foreign sources may convey." Id. Similarly, Justice
O'Connor stated that "[a]lthough international law and the law of other nations are
rarely binding upon our decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions reached by other countries and by the international community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts." O'Connor, supra note 8, at 350. Finally, Justice Breyer, although he is the most vocal member of the Court on this debate, has stated repeatedly
that foreign authorities are not "binding" or "controlling" but "helpful." Scalia-Breyer
Conversation,supra note 8, at 524, 528.
23 Although there is an analytic distinction
to be made between "binding" and
"constitutive," treating foreign legal materials as constitutive does not look much different from treating them as binding authority as far as the judicial borrowing debate
is concerned. Compare the following propositions. Proposition 1: Penal practice p is
cruel and unusual if it is the case that foreign authorities a have decided, in manner m,
that penal practice p is not permitted. Proposition 2: Penal practice p is 'cruel and
unusual' if it is the case that foreign authorities a have decided, in manner m, that penal practice p is not permitted, and this is so because that would make penalpractice p 'unusual' in the sense of rare or uncommon. In the first proposition, foreign authorities are
binding; in the second, they are constitutive. If the worry with the first proposition is
that it undermines our sovereignty, the same worry should apply to the second proposition. Therefore, from the sovereigntists' perspective, there is no meaningful difference between binding and constitutive. For an argument along these lines, see Young,
supra note 3, at 155-56.
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attempt to end this debate with the argument that foreign legal authorities are "relevant" in the trivial sense that they constitute simply
one type of source among many thatjudges may consult, such as trea24
tises, restatements, law review articles, popular music, and poetry.
This "no big deal "2 argument is somewhat disingenuous for two reasons. First, it is no accident that the Supreme Court, when it cites foreign sources, cites legal authorities,such as court decisions and international treaties, and not, say, the latest book from Habermas. When
the Court does so, the problem is not that the sources being cited are
irrelevant but that they appear highly relevant and even potentially authoritative, due to their status as legal authorities somewhere else. Second, the rhetorical power of statements like, "the United States is the
only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty," 26 cannot be ignored. 27 The Roper Court engaged in this rhetoric presumably as a way of increasing the persuasive
force of its legal conclusion. The Supreme Court is using this mode
of argumentation as a way of justifying a particular exercise of power,
which is not a bad thing in itself, but we must scrutinize it and ask ourselves whether the persuasive force such citations carry is justifiable. s
And the only way to do that is to examine what exactly it is about the
existence of an international consensus that is carrying the rhetorical
load as persuasive authority and whether the load can be justified.
This Article argues that it cannot be justified, not because international consensus is not binding, not because it is not relevant, not be-

cause it is not constitutive, but because it is not persuasive.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses how the Court
has used foreign sources in Roper v. Simmons as well as in similar
Eighth Amendment decisions over the years and describes its practice
as a "norm-centric," as opposed to "reason-centric," analysis. The
terms "norm-centric" and "reason-centric" refer to two different ways
of using foreign materials in constitutional interpretation. One may
cite a foreign norm for or against a given practice and consider the

24 See, e.g., Tushnet, Knowing Less, supra note 12, at
1278.
25 Id.
26

Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.

27 Cf. NICHOLAS RESCHER, PLURALISM:

AGAINST THE DEMAND FOR CONSENSUS 6

(1993) ("The belief that consensus plays a leading role in matters of rational inquiry,
decision, and evaluation is among the oldest and most pervasive ideas of philosophy.");
id. at 21-28 (surveying "philosophical partisans of cognitive consensus").
28

Cf DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997)

concept of the rule of law and its ideological implications).

(scrutinizing the
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existence of the norm itself to be relevant to whether a particular
practice should be permitted under the U.S. Constitution. Or, one
may instead cite a foreign norm for or against a practice and consider
whether the reasons behind the norm are applicable to constitutional
interpretation. The former mode of analysis (norm-centric) takes the
existence of a prevailing norm to be significant in itself, whereas the
latter mode of analysis (reason-centric) explores reasons behind a
prevailing norm and asks whether such reasons to endorse the norm
apply in the domestic context. Part I argues that the current Supreme
Court practice of citing foreign laws is best characterized as• employing
29
the norm-centric analysis. The rest of the Article accordingly focuses
on the norm-centric analysis, although this assumption will be reexamined in Part IV.
Parts II and III address the question of the Court's practice of
looking at foreign sources in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Here we immediately encounter a difficulty. The Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in this area is a mess. Different readings of the case law
are possible, and, as noted above, different readings invite different
articulations about the relationship between domestic doctrine and
foreign laws. Part II thus takes as its starting point a particular interpretation of Roper's doctrinal context, which is that cases like Roper
should be analyzed in terms of the principles that the harshness of
punishment should not exceed the gravity of the crime and that one
should not be punished more harshly than one deserves. The operative normative idea in this context, in other words, should be proportionality. This interpretation, I believe, is the correct reading of this
jurisprudence, and I have defended it in detail previously. 30 This
reading is hardly outside the mainstream, 3 but it is by no means in-

I say "accordingly" because to the extent that the current controversy over foreign legal materials stems from the Court's practice in cases like Roper and Atkins, any
defense or criticism of the practice of citing foreign laws should start with the actual
practice, not with an idealized version that bears little resemblance to reality. See also
infra Part IV.
30 See Youngjae Lee, The ConstitutionalRight Against Excessive
Punishment, 91 VA. L.
REv.677, 687-99 (2005).
31 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection:
Comments on the
Civil-Criminal Distinction, with ParticularReference to Sexually Violent PredatorLaws, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 83 (1996) ("[The] just-deserts limit governs Eighth
Amendment proportionalityjurisprudence (in death cases, at any rate) ....
");Carol S.
Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the
Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 765 n.44 (2005) (arguing that the principle that
"proportionality is a constraint on just punishment" is "deeply embedded in American
29

2007] INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS AS PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY

73

disputable, as it rationalizes a doctrinal area characterized by incoherence, controversy, and fractured opinions. 32 But we have to start somewhere--a particular interpretation of the relevant doctrinal contextin order to advance the analysis. Assuming, then, that the relevant inquiry is that of proportionality, Part II argues that the existence of an
international consensus against the juvenile death penalty does not
illuminate whether the juvenile death penalty is a practice that imposes disproportionate--or excessively harsh-punishments.
Part III loosens the presumption that we should attempt to make
sense of the Court's citation of foreign sources in this doctrinal context by seeking a tight fit between our understanding of the Eighth
Amendment in terms of proportionality and what we can infer from
an international consensus. Part III thus asks instead: Does the conclusion of Part II change once we ask whether the norm-centric analysis is relevant in helping us think about whether a punishment is
''cruel and unusual," or even more generally, "unjust" or "immoral,"
regardless of whether the problem with the practice has to do with the
question of proportionality? In order to answer this question, Part III
explores the broad issue of the epistemic significance of consensus.
That is, when there is an overwhelming consensus on a given moral
issue, what is its significance for the purposes of one's moral deliberation? Part III answers this question by drawing analogies to different
kinds of consensus-aesthetic, scientific, and moral-and argues that
the norm-centric analysis cannot be defended even if we reframe the
question without relying on the notion of proportionality.
Part IV considers whether the problems with the norm-centric
analysis pointed out in Parts II and III can be solved simply byjettisoning the norm-centric analysis and adopting the reason-centric analysis.

law and society" and "has been repeatedly invoked by the Supreme Court for nearly a
century as the bedrock of its Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence").
32 The literature on the Eighth Amendment is enormous. For a sampling of different approaches, see, for example, Laurence Claus, The Antidiscrimination Eighth
Amendment, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119 (2004); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality"Relative to What?,
89 MINN. L. REv. 571 (2005); Margaret Jane Radin, TheJurisprudenceof Death: Evolving
Standardsfor the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989 (1978);
Alice Ristroph, ProportionalityAs a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263
(2005); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Antonin
Scalia, Response, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra, at 129, 14547; Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838 (1972).
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Part IV dismisses this possibility for two reasons. First, it is unlikely
that the Court will shift to the reason-centric analysis in the near future, given its 'judicial minimalist" 33 tendencies, at least in the Eighth
Amendment context. That is, the reason the Court engages with the
norm-centric analysis as opposed to the reason-centric analysis in looking to foreign sources is not because of some momentary confusion
about how to engage with foreign legal materials that can be easily
fixed once a clear theory is articulated for the Court to adopt. Rather,
there are deeper reasons behind the Court's tendency to employ the
norm-centric analysis in applying foreign legal materials to the domestic context, and such reasons will make it difficult to dislodge the
Court from its current mode of engaging with foreign legal materials.
Second, the main alternative to the norm-centric analysis, the reason-centric analysis, is biased against consulting foreign sources in
which reasons behind a particular norm or practice are opaque. That
is, the reason-centric analysis may justify consulting legal sources produced by processes in which reason-giving is routinely practicedsuch as judicial decisions-but not legal materials that do not always
make clear the reasons behind a given legal norm. This means that
the reason-centric analysis may make unavailable many of the legal
materials-such as international treaties-that the proponents of citing foreign laws favor as legitimate sources for consultation. In other
words, abandoning the norm-centric analysis to avoid its problems
may be too costly for the proponents of consulting foreign laws because for certain types of foreign legal materials, the norm-centric
analysis may be the only available kind of analysis.
This Article concludes with a caveat. There is an important limitation to the arguments advanced in this Article. One implication of
limiting the scope of this Article to the question of persuasiveness of
foreign authorities is that it assumes a strict separation between domestic law on one hand and foreign and international law on the
other, and asks whether foreign and international law illuminate questions raised in domestic law. But one need not be bound by this picture. It is also possible to reject the separation and the accompanying
tendency to prioritize domestic constitutional law over foreign laws
and imagine the boundary between domestic constitutional law and

33

The phrase is borrowed from Cass Sunstein's work. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN,

ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITI-

CAL CONFLICT 171-82 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING].

2007]

INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS AS PERSUASIVE A UTHORITY

75

foreign norms to be more fluid and permeable. This Article will end
with a quick sketch of this alternative vision-not to defend or criticize
it, but to emphasize that, given the doubts that this Article raises about
the idea that others' legal norms somehow help us think through our
constitutional problems, if the current Supreme Court practice is to
be justified at all, its justification would have to rest ultimately on the
strength of arguments provided by what may be called the "International Constitution School."
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF FOREIGN LEGAL MATERIALS
IN THE PROPORTIONALITYJURISPRUDENCE

In holding the juvenile death penalty to be unconstitutional, the
Roper Court applied the doctrinal framework developed in the years
since Coker v. Georgia. Under this framework, the Court first reviews
attitudes of legislatures and behaviors of juries to identify
a national
S 31
consensus on the sentencing practice in question.
Second, the
Court engages in an independent proportionality analysis to determine whether the Court agrees with the national consensus.3 5 The
Roper Court found that there was a national consensus against imposition of the death penalty on juveniles and further concluded that
"neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for
imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders. 37
Then, in support of its holding, the Court noted that "the United
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official
sanction to the juvenile death penalty., 38 The Court also mentioned
several human rights conventions, including the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, and African Charter
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, which all include a prohibi-

34 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-67 (2005); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 313-17 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-77, 380 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823-33 (1988) (plurality opinion);
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152-55 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-96
(1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-97 (1976) (plurality opinion).
35 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-75; Atkins, 536
U.S. at 317-21; Thompson, 487 U.S. at
833-38; Tison, 481 U.S. at 155-58; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-801; Coker, 433 U.S. at 597600. But see Stanford, 492 U.S. at 379-80 (rejecting the "proportionality" analysis).
316 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (comparing the evidence of national consensus with

that presented in Atkins).
. Id. at 572.
Id. at 575.
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tion of the juvenile death penalty. 3 The Court added that "only seven
countries other than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and China," and that "[s]ince then each
of these countries has either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice. " °
The Roper Court's use of foreign sources is similar to the way the
Court has used foreign sources over the years in the same doctrinal
context. For instance, in Coker, while holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibited imposition of the death penalty for the crime
of rape, the plurality noted that it is "not irrelevant here that out of 60
major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death
penalty for rapeS41where death did not ensue," citing a UN study on
capital punishment. In Enmund v. Florida,while considering the felony murder doctrine in the Eighth Amendment context in 1982, the
Court repeated Coker's formulation-"not irrelevant"-and stated that
it is "worth noting that the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental
42
Europe."
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, in which the Court held in 1988 that it
was cruel and unusual to impose the penalty of death for crimes
committed by those under the age of sixteen, the Court stated that
[t]he conclusion that it would offend civilized standards of decency to
execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her
offense is consistent with the views that have been expressed by respected professional organizations, by other nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western
European Community.

The Court then went on to observe that "[t] he death penalty has been
abolished in Australia, except in the State of New South Wales," and
also in "West Germany, France, Portugal, the Netherlands, and all of
the Scandinavian countries, and is available only for exceptional
crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland." 44

39 Id. at
40

576.

Id. at 577.

Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).
43 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).
44 Id. at 830-31.
41
42
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"Juvenile executions," the Court further noted, "are also prohibited in
the Soviet Union," as well as in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.4 ' In Atkins, the Court mentioned, citing a brief submitted by the
European Union, that "within the world community, the imposition of
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offend46
ers is overwhelmingly disapproved."
For the purposes of this Article, the important thing to note is the
way the Court used foreign legal materials in Roper and other cases in
the same doctrinal context. As noted in the Introduction, we may distinguish between "norm-centric" and "reason-centric" reasoning.
Norm-centric reasoning cites a foreign norm for or against a given
practice and considers the existence of the norm itself to be relevant
to the issue whether a particular practice should be permitted. Reason-centric reasoning cites a foreign norm for or against a practice
and considers whether the reason behind the existence of the foreign
norm is applicable to our domestic constitutional interpretation.47
To illustrate, consider the question of whether capital punishment
is cruel and unusual and in violation of the Constitution. Under the
norm-centric analysis, the existence of an international consensus
against capital punishment has an independent significance as a fact
that is relevant to the question of whether the death penalty should be
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. By contrast, under
the reason-centric analysis, the analysis would proceed in two steps.
First, what is the reason behind the international consensus against
capital punishment? Second, is the reason behind the consensus relevant to our constitutional analysis? So, if the consensus against capital
punishment is premised on the view that it is not cost-effective, the
next question would be whether the reason that capital punishment is
not cost-effective should be a consideration that is relevant to our
reading of the Constitution.
In Roper and other cases, the mode of analysis the Court engages
in is norm-centric, or, as one commentator noted, a form of "nosecounting. 4 8 The Court did not engage with foreign legal systems
deeply to understand why there may be a prevailing norm against a

Id. at 831 & n.34.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
47 For a similar distinction, see Larsen, supra note 12, at 1291-97
(distinguishing
between "reason-borrowing" and "moral fact-finding") and Young, supra note 3, at 15356 (using the terms "persuasive authority" and "nose-counting authority").
48 Young, supra note 3, at 149-56.
45
46
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practice but instead noted an area characterized by a widespread
agreement. The rest of the Article examines this practice.
II.

PROPORTIONALITY AND INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS

A. The Eighth Amendment As a Retributivist Constraint
Roper is the latest case from the Supreme Court's nearly centuryold jurisprudence on proportionality in sentencing. Unlike cases that
prohibit certain types of punishments, such as burning at the stake,
crucifixion, and drawing and quartering, or certain conditions-ofconfinement cases, 49 these cases are about constitutionally permitted
types of punishment that are nevertheless unconstitutional because
they are excessive for the crimes for which they are imposed. This
category of cases may be read as an instantiation of the retributivist
principle that the harshness of punishment should not exceed the
gravity of the crime, or that one should not be punished more harshly
than one deserves. 5° Some may offer alternative interpretations, 51 and
different interpretations may call for different answers to the central
question of this Article. It is beyond the scope of this Article to refute
all alternative interpretations. Elsewhere, I have argued in detail for
this particular retributivist reading of the law,52 and I am hardly alone
in reading the case law this way in any event. 3 Instead of rehashing
my arguments for the retributivist reading, I will proceed in this Part
with the assumption that it is correct. This assumption will be relaxed
in Part III.
The challenge is to articulate the relationship between the principle in the excessive punishment cases that one should not be punished more harshly than one deserves and the practice of looking
overseas for answers to the question of what one does or does not deserve. The first step in understanding this issue is to ask what kind of
statement we are making when we say that a punishment is undeservedly harsh. The Supreme Court's decisions in this area may be re-

49Eg.Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-06 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 170-71 (1976) (plurality opinion); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).
50 See Lee, supra note
30, at 699-700.
51 See sources cited supra note
32.
52 Lee, supra note
30.
53 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 31, at 82-83; Steiker, supra note 31, at 765-69.
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stated as follows: Rape is not a crime deserving of the death penalty. 4
Robbery is not a crime deserving of the death penalty.5 Mentally retarded criminals do not deserve to be put to death. 6 Juvenile offenders do not deserve to be put to death.
Notice that such judgments of "cruel and unusual" in the excessive punishment context are qualitatively different from judgments of
"cruel and unusual" made when we decide that, say, drawing and
quartering should not be allowed or that certain prison conditions
cross the line and become cruel and unusual. "Drawing and quartering" and certain prison conditions would be considered "cruel and
unusual" no matter how heinous the crime or the criminal is because
the practice itself is objectionable, but once we are talking about types
of punishments that are permitted, the judgment of "cruel and unusual" cannot be made without also considering how heinous a crime
or criminal is. That is, when we say that "drawing and quartering" is
"cruel and unusual," we are saying that certain penal practices simply
should not take place in our society no matter how bad the criminal,
but when we say that the death penalty is excessive because it is undeserved for the crime of rape, we are saying that there is a mismatch between the gravity of the crime and the harshness of the punishment.
So what kind of statement is a desert statement? AsJoel Feinberg
explained, desert statements have the form, "A deserves X in virtue of
Y," where A is the deserving person, Xis what he deserves, and Y is the
desert basis.5s The relationship between X, what is deserved, and Y,
the desert basis, is that of "fittingness" or "appropriateness., 59 "Fittingness" in the punishment context refers to the idea that the harshness of the punishment should reflect our level of condemnation or
disapproval of the criminal act. Thus, a punishment would be excessive if the degree of condemnation symbolized by the amount of punishment were too high relative to the criminal's blameworthiness.
This further implies that the harshness of the punishment should increase as our level of condemnation or disapproval increases, which in
turn should increase with the gravity of the crime. In other words, the
question of what punishment is deserved for what crime changes de54 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-600 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
55 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 781, 789-801
(1982).
56 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 313-21 (2002).
57 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,564-79
(2005).
8 JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal
Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN
THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILIfY 55, 61 (1970).
59 Id. at

81-82.
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pending on our perception of how serious the crime (or the criminal)
*

60

is.

B. Desert ComparisonsAcrossJurisdictions
Given the features of the practice of blame as discussed, under
what conditions would we be justified in looking at foreign sources
when we are trying to determine whether it is the case that a certain
punishment is undeserved for a crime or a criminal? In other words,
when the Supreme Court notices that "the United States is the only
country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty," 61 what should be its significance for our desert
judgment?
To answer this question, consider the following. Assume that
there are ten countries, A through J. To simplify the analysis, assume
that there is only one form of punishment, imprisonment, and further
assume that there is only one theory of punishment, retribution, that
all countries employ to determine the appropriate amounts of punishment. Now assume that there is a way to compare punishments
that these countries impose for a crime committed in a certain situation by a certain offender, which we will call "crime x." If A's punishment for crime x, measured in terms of amount of time spent in
prison, is substantially higher than the punishment that countries B
through J are willing to impose, what should the fact of A's apparent
harshness compared to the rest of the countries tell us about A's desert judgment?
There are several possibilities. First, A simply got the desert
judgment wrong and should bring its punishment in line with all the
other countries. This is the argument implied in Roper about the juvenile death penalty in the United States. Second, A got the desert
judgment right and everyone else is wrong. Third, no country is mistaken, but the punishments look different because A has a different
understanding of the seriousness of "crime x" from that of B through
J "Crime x" may simply be viewed as a more serious violation in A
than it is in B throughJ

60 See JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 58, at 95, 118; see also R.A.
DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 132-35 (2001); ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 15-17 (1993).
61 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
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Fourth, no country is mistaken, but the punishments look different because A has an inflated scale of imprisonment compared to B
through J, so that the message sent by the same amount of punishment may be quite different in different countries. That is, perhaps
five years in prison is a mild punishment considering A's overall level
of harshness in punishment, whereas B through Jwould take the same
amount of punishment very seriously because imprisonment is rare.
Fifth, it is also possible that the reason the punishment allowed in A is
not allowed in B through J is that imprisonment of more than a certain number of years is simply not available in B through J, no matter
how serious a crime is, for reasons not having to do with desert but
with other considerations, such as a country's particular understanding of what human dignity requires.
The question, again, is what the fact that country A is willing to
impose a sentence of imprisonment that lasts longer than countries B
through J for the same crime-"crime x"-should tell us about the validity of A's desert judgment. The conclusion that A's desert judgment is wrong is certainly a possibility, but, as we saw, it is not the only
possibility.
The reason all these possibilities exist is that desert is a concept
that is indeterminate and highly context-specific in action (why do the
62
winners of Olympic events receive a "gold medal," for instance?).
Different jurisdictions that apply the same desert principles to devise
their sentencing regimes may end up producing punishments that
look very different, and one jurisdiction may have a different understanding of the blameworthiness of "crime x"' from everyone else without violating the principle of desert. Because the amount of punishment appropriate for a given crime depends on the level of
blameworthiness expressed by different amounts of punishment, different places may attach different significances to the punishment
that looks the same on the surface.
Also, there is nothing in the principle of desert that answers the
question of whether the death penalty should be reserved only for his62 See FEINBERG,

supra note 60, at 100 ("To say that the very physical treatment itself expresses condemnation is to say simply that certain forms of hard treatment have
become the conventional symbols of public reprobation.... Moreover, particular
kinds of punishment are often used to express quite specific attitudes... ; note the
differences, for example, between beheading a nobleman and hanging a yeoman,
burning a heretic and hanging a traitor, hanging an enemy soldier and executing him
by firing squad."); id. at 114 ("Even floggings and imposed fastings do not constitute
punishments, then, where social conventions are such that they do not express public
censure....").
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toric instances of evil that a society experiences rarely or whether it
should be more readily available so that it can be imposed on the
worst group of criminals selected from instances of criminal offenses
that a society experiences more routinely, such as homicide. Finally,
there is nothing in the principle of desert that requires the death
penalty or precludes limitations on punishment for reasons having little to do with the principle of desert. Even if, as we have assumed, the
only theory of punishment available is retibutivism, there may be
other constraints that limit the types and amounts of punishment that
can be imposed. (For instance, members of a society may agree that a
certain criminal deserves to be tortured but still maintain that he
should nevertheless not be tortured for dignitarian reasons.)
To apply this general framework to the juvenile death penalty
context, perhaps the fact that "the United States is the only country in
the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death
penalty" means that the United States is willing to impose on juvenile
offenders punishments that are undeservedly harsh. But it is also possible that, for whatever reason, the United States is the only country
that is willing to impose on some juvenile offenders the punishment
that they deserve, and the rest of the international community should
learn from the United States.63 It is also possible that the United
States is willing to hold people fully responsible for their acts at a
younger age than other countries do, simply because of our own particular understanding of the age at which people should be held responsible for their acts.

63 For an argument along these lines, see Robert
Blecker, A Poster Child for Us, 89
JUDICATURE 297, 299-301 (2006).
64 Where childhood ends and adulthood begins is not an easy
question. The inconclusive nature of Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which defines a "child" as "every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the
law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier," reflects the difficulty of the linedrawing problem in this area. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added); see also Thomas Hammarberg, Justicefor Children Through the UN Convention, in JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN 59, 64 (Stewart Asquith &
Malcolm Hill eds., 1994) ("Obviously, this wording [of Article 1] is the result of a compromise."). For some discussions of complexities of this issue, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 17-22 (2005); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (2000); see also Anthony N. Doob and
Michael Tonry, Varieties of Youth Justice, in YOUTH CRIME AND YOUTH JUSTICE: COM-

PARATIVE AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECrIVES 1, 5-10 (Michael Tonry & Anthony N.

Doob eds., 2004); Jeffrey Fagan, Atkins, Adolescence, and the Maturity Heuristic: Rationales
for a CategoricalExemption forJuveniles from Capital Punishment,33 N.M. L. REV. 207, 22325, 248-52 (2003); Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of
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It is also possible that we do not take the death penalty as seriously
as some of the other countries that allow the death penalty. That is,
some of these other countries may reserve the death penalty only for
the most exceptional circumstances, such as acts of terrorism, genocide, and other instances that qualify as acts of evil of historic magnitude, and crimes committed by juvenile offenders rarely rise to that
level. 65 Finally, it is also possible that the reason the juvenile death
penalty is not allowed in some of those other countries is simply that
the death penalty as a mode of punishment is not allowed at all in
those countries for reasons not necessarily having to do with desert.66
Atkins for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 545-52 (2003);
Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799 (2003).
65 See ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 252 (3d ed.
2002) (listing countries that, as of December 2001, have abolished the death penalty
for ordinary crimes but retained them for exceptional crimes); id. at 35 (discussing
Israel's retention of the death penalty "for all crimes except those connected with the
Holocaust"); id. at 49-50 (discussing India's "'rarest of the rare' cases principle" (quoting Singh v. Punjab, (1980) 2 S.C.J. 475, 524)); see also Julia Eckert, Death and the Nation: State Killing in India, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECIVES 195, 195-97 (Austin Sarat & Christian Boulanger eds., 2005)
(discussing death sentences for crimes involving Muslim terrorism, caste violence, and
Hindu nationalism).
66 See HOOD, supra note 65, at 249-52 (listing countries that
have completely abolished capital punishment). It is beyond the scope of this Article to survey the history
of abolition of the death penalty worldwide and explore individual countries' reasons
for abolition, but even a quick glance shows a variety of rationales behind the abolitionist movement. See id. at 26-27 (reporting that "[m]ost West European nations have
come to recognize that ... capital punishment inflicted by the state is contrary to their
commitment to maintain human rights" and mentioning as examples Switzerland,
which thought the death penalty to be "a flagrant violation of the right to life and dignity"; Spain, which believed the death penalty to be "degrading"; and Greece, which
declared human life to be "of supreme value" and stated that "efficiency of the death
penalty has been proven non-existent"); see also S v Makwanyane & Another 1995 (2)
SACR I (CC) at 52-53, 115 (S. Afr.) (citing both the "rights to life and dignity" and the
spirit of reconciliation (as opposed to revenge) behind the constitution as reasons for
holding the death penalty unconstitutional); RICHARD J. EVANS, RITUALS OF RETRIBUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN GERMANY 1600-1987, at 775-804, 855-71 (1996) (examining the death penalty abolition movement in East and West Germany); ShaiJ. Lavi,
Imagining the Death Penalty in Israel: Punishment, Violence, Vengeance, and Revenge, in THE
CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPEGI'IVES, supra note 65,
at 219, 228 ("Among the primary reasons still given for opposing the death penalty for
terrorists is the risk of drawing punishment into a cycle of revenge and of turning terrorists into martyrs."); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 746 (2005)
("Israel does not execute terrorists, in part because of a belief that executions of terrorists would breed more terrorism .... "); Patrick Timmons, Seed of Abolition: Experience and Culture in the Desire To End Capital Punishment in Mexico, 1841-1857, in THE
CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 65,
at 69, 74-78 (linking Mexico's attitude to the death penalty with its experience with po-
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The upshot of all this is that it is not obvious how one can go from
the observation that the United States is the only country in the world
that allows the juvenile death penalty to the conclusion that the
United States is allowing undeservedly harsh punishments on certain
juvenile offenders. In order to draw that conclusion, all the other
possibilities that are consistent with the principle of desert would
somehow have to be ruled out, and the work of ruling out all the
other options may actually require the kind of moral knowledge that
was initially lacking and inspired the Court to turn its gaze overseas in
the first place. In other words, the particular "moral shortcut" the
Court attempted to take by looking to other countries' penal practices
may not be warranted. And doing it correctly would actually involve a
long detour.
That is not all. Recall that up to now we have assumed that all
countries follow the retributivist theory of punishment. Now let's relax this assumption and revisit the question we started with: If A's
punishment for crime x, measured in terms of amount of time spent
in prison, is substantially higher than the punishment that countries B
through J are willing to impose, what should the fact of A's apparent
harshness compared to other countries tell us about A's desert judgment? Now, on top of all the possibilities we have discussed, introducing different sentencing philosophies multiplies potential explanations.
Perhaps in some countries it was determined that the
punishment A is willing to impose is far more than sufficient to get the
desired level of deterrent effect. Others may have decided that the
amount that would be imposed in A would be far more than is necessary to rehabilitate criminals charged with crime x. 6' Yet others may
have determined that the incapacitation theory does not justify keeping criminals convicted of crime x for the amount of prison time that
A would require. So looking at other countries to determine whether
one's punishment is undeservedly harsh for crime x is of limited use
even when one assumes that all countries follow the retributivist phi-

litical repression and its preventive philosophy of punishment); Elizabeth Vicens,
Note, Application of the Federal Death Penalty Act to Puerto Rico: A New Test for the Locally
Inapplicable Standard, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 350, 376, 382-84 (2005) (discussing the Puerto
Rican attitude toward the death penalty); cf JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE
(2003) (discussing cultural differences between the United States and Europe as an
explanation for differing approaches to state punishment).
67 Cf HOOD, supra note 65, at 26 (reporting that Spain "took
the view" in 1995 that
the death penalty is "contrary to the philosophy of punishment enshrined in our Constitution, where punishment is seen as a means of rehabilitation").
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losophies of punishment. Once we add into the mix different purposes of punishment, the informative value of looking at other countries for the purposes of assessing one's own desertjudgments starts to
approach zero.
The conclusion that there is nothing necessarily disturbing about
having sentences differ in different jurisdictions for roughly equivalent crimes is nothing new in the sentencing literature. This point has
been most frequently made recently in the debate surrounding regional variations in enforcing federal criminal law and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. If there is a strong case anywhere for uniformity in sentencing across different geographic regions it is in the
context of administering federal criminal law across the country.
However, as many have argued, a combination of prosecutorial and
judicial discretion leads to disparities in federal sentencing in different regions. Such disparities should not necessarily be worrisome and
are in fact desirable in many instances.
Given all this, what should we make of the Court's citation of
other countries' domestic penal practices in Roper and other proportionality cases? In Roper the Court observed that "the United States is
the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to
the juvenile death penalty"; that "only seven countries other than the
United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and China"; and that "[s]ince then each of these countries has
either abolished capital punishment for juveniles or made public disavowal of the practice." 6 Similarly in Coker, the plurality of the Court
noted that "it is... not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in
the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape
where death did not ensue." 70 And in Enmund, the Court stated that

68 See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Sentencing, 58 STAN. L.
REV.
137, 139-41 (2005) (distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate regional variations in federal criminal sentencing); Frank Bowman et al., Panel II: The Effects of Region, Circuit, Caseloadand ProsecutorialPolicies on Disparity, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 165, 165
(2003); John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General
Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697
(2003); Katherine Tang Newburger, CaseloadMatters: Caseload Composition as an Explanation for Regional Sentencing Differences, 15 FED. SENT'G REP. 197, 197 (2003); lan
Weinstein, The Historical Roots of Regional Sentencing Variation, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 495, 495 (2006) ("[P]erhaps we should respect a modicum of regional variation
and not seek to eliminate every vestige of regional legal culture in America.").
G Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575,577 (2004).
70 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596
n.10 (1976).
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"[i]t is ...worth noting that the doctrine of felony murder has been
abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a
number of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.'
The discussion thus far implies that it is opaque what such observations can tell us about whether the desert judgment being challenged-for instance, that some offenders under the age of eighteen
may deserve the death penalty-is right or wrong. Such observations
in fact tell us very little about the issue, and if it is indeed possible to
rule out various reasons not to find other countries' practices probative, then it is not clear what foreign sources add. In short, those who
can demonstrate the informativeness of foreign laws likely have no
need for them, whereas those who cannot demonstrate their usefulness should not rely on them.
Finally, the Court has relied on two types of sources from outside
the United States: comparative and international. My reservations
have so far been directed at the use of comparative materials, which
has the form of "Countries B through J do things differently from
Country A." But what about the Court's reliance on various international treaties? For instance, in Roper, the Court cited the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and
the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 2 The
same criticisms I have outlined above apply here, but the problems
deepen. On top of having to compare different jurisdictions with differing desert judgments and philosophies of punishment, now we
need to establish an additional link-the relationship between each
country's penal judgments and the fact that the countries have signed
onto such treaties. Why countries enter human rights treaties and
what difference human rights treaties make are subjects on which
there is already an extensive literature. 73 But whatever the reason
countries sign such treaties, there is no reason why we should allow
the fact that international human rights treaties ban one practice or
another to influence our judgments about who deserves what pun-

71

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).

72 Roper, 543 U.S. at
576.
73 For a useful summary, see Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human
Rights Treaties Make a

Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1942-62 (2002). See alsoJACKL. GOLDSMITH & ERIC PosNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 107-34 (2005); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins
of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in PostwarEurope, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 220
(2000).
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ishment, at least without going through much work to demonstrate
that alternative explanations do not apply.
III. CRUELTY AND INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS
A. What Kind of Consensus?
Some may object that I am missing the point of comparisons. The
question is not, the objection will go, whether the fact that no other
country practices the juvenile death penalty can yield the conclusion
that juvenile offenders do not deserve the death penalty. The claim,
rather, is that we can draw normative significance from the fact that
there appears to be a near universal consensus on the issue whether
the juvenile death penalty should be allowed as a penal practice. That
is, putting things in terms of desert unduly constrains the inquiry.
What we can draw from the fact that no other country appears to
practice the juvenile death penalty-and that countries around the
world are willing to go further and agree to conventions that explicitly
ban the juvenile death penalty-is that there exists a universal norm
against the practice, whether the norm has to do with desert or otherwise. And to the extent that the juvenile death penalty prohibition
deals with a penal practice, the argument would go, the international
consensus must be relevant to our understanding of what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment.
This line of reasoning is plausible, but raises a number of questions. It is clear that we have a constitutional question on one hand,
and an international consensus that appears to address the constitutional question on the other hand. But what is unclear is how we
should conceive of the relationship between the two. That is, what
exactly is the significance of an international consensus against a penal practice for the purposes of interpreting the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause? The purpose of the discussion in Part II was to
rule out, or at least complicate the path of arriving at, one possible answer-that the international consensus reflects the view that the death
penalty is an undeservedly harsh punishment for juvenile offenders.
Setting that possible answer aside, then, how else should we conceive
of the relationship? Much of the answer to this question turns on how
we ought to characterize the nature of the international consensus,
because different types of consensus dictate different answers.
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Jeremy Waldron gives one characterization of the consensus in a
recent comment on Roper in the HarvardLaw Review.'4 He argues that
when we confront the issue of when it is proper to cite foreign law, we
should think the issue through in terms of the "law of nations," or ius
gentium, by which he means "a body of law purporting to represent
what various domestic legal systems share in the way of common answers to common problems." 75 Jus gentium, the way Waldron conceives
of it, represents "the accumulated wisdom of the world on rights and
justice" from "the decisions of judges and lawmakers grappling with
real problems." 76 Waldron compares the law of nations to an established body of scientific findings and suggests that when we confront a
problem like the juvenile death penalty, we should "treat it as a problem to be solved in part by attending to the established deliverances of
legal science-the enterprise ... of grappling with, untangling, and
rival rights and claims that come together in issues of
resolving the
77
kind.",
this
Waldron's proposal is worth considering in detail. The questions
that we ultimately have to answer when we see an international consensus against a penal practice are what the nature of the consensus is,
and what the consensus should accordingly mean for us. Waldron's
answer is that we should view the consensus as analogous to a scientific consensus, as "solutions to certain kinds of problems in the law
[that] might get established in the way that scientific theories are established. '' 78 In defending the analogy to science, Waldron contrasts it
against two other types of consensus: aesthetic consensus and moral
consensus. When Justice Thomas argues that the "Court's Eighth
Amendmentjurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans," 79 the suggestion is that the international consensus against a penal practice is, at best, like an aesthetic consensus
and a transient one at that. Waldron rejects the analogy,8 ° and at the
same time distances ius gentium from another kind of consensus that
may appear more obviously appropriate in the death penalty con-

74
75

Waldron, supra note 3.
Id. at 133; see also H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HIsTORIcAL INTRODUC-

TION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAw 104-07 (3d ed. 1972).
76 Waldron, supra note
3, at 138.
77
78

Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.

Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari).
80 Waldron, supra note 3, at 144.
79
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text-a moral consensus that is arrived at through making "moral
judgments" by answering "direct moral questions about justice and
81
rights."
We thus have three kinds of consensus on the table as potentially
analogous to the international consensus on the question of the juvenile death penalty: scientific, aesthetic, and moral. Justice Thomas
invokes the image of an aesthetic consensus in order to dismiss the
practice in question. Waldron, in response, says that an international
legal consensus is like a scientific consensus, while carefully distinguishing it from the notion of a moral consensus. In the following
sections, I consider these various analogies. My purpose here is not
necessarily to declare one analogy as the winner over the other two,
but to attempt to answer the question-"What is the significance of an
international consensus against the juvenile death penalty?"-through
discussing proper attitudes toward consensus within each context.
B. Scientific Consensus
Waldron says that we should think of international legal consensus
as analogous to "the established body of scientific findings," which
"stands as a repository of enormous value to individual researchers as
they go about their work., 82 He argues that "it is unthinkable that any
of them would try to proceed without drawing on that repository to
supplement their own individual research and to provide a basis for its
critique and evaluation."
He adds further that "[n]o one in the
modern world would take seriously novel claims about energy or gravity that did not refer to the work of the scientific community at large,"
and that ius gentium serves as the similar site for "the accumulated wisdom of the world on rights and justice."84 I single out Waldron here
because he is, as far as I am aware, the only scholar who has made this
analogy to defend the practice5 of consulting foreign legal materials in
constitutional interpretation.8
Waldron is of course correct when he says that it would be absurd
for a scientist to disregard an established body of scientific knowledge.
A more difficult question is whether the analogy holds, given the dif-

81
82
83

84

Id. at 137.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 132-33.

Id. at 138.

This is not to say that his suggestion has not been embraced by others. For a
positive reaction, see Cleveland, supra note 3, at 10-11.
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ferences between scientific inquiries and legal-moral inquiries. Can
the question of whether to permit the juvenile death penalty be answered by consulting an established body of moral and legal knowledgesG the way scientists consult an established body of scientific
knowledge to learn about "energy or gravity"?8 7 Waldron correctly
characterizes the "relation between the juvenile death penalty and the
values embodied in the Eighth Amendment" as involving "dignitarian
issues and the tangled issues of culpability and responsibility.
However, it is not obvious why working through the "tangled issues of culpability and responsibility" is similar to making observations about
"energy or gravity" in a way that warrants the analogy that Waldron
puts forward.
The analogy is not warranted because a scientific consensus has a
different epistemic status from a moral consensus. Even when scientists disagree among themselves, there is broad agreement among
them on the question of how such disagreements may be resolvedthat is, how one should go about finding answers to these questions,
what kind of evidence is relevant to answering these questions, what
procedures should be used to collect this kind of evidence, what kinds
of inferences are warranted by the evidence collected, and so on.8 9
The existence of such agreements on methodological questions comes
with an understanding as to the nature of the collective enterprise:
namely, to describe the physical world as it is. Thus, we understand
how to treat scientific consensus on a question, since we understand
what it is that scientists are doing and what standards must be met before a proposition attains the status of scientific knowledge. Again,
how we respond to different types of consensus turns on what the con-

I use the phrase "moral and legal knowledge" here because, as Waldron recognizes, the relationship between law and morality in this context is not easy to sort
through. See Waldron, supra note 3, at 136 ("Historians of jurisprudence have spent
gallons of ink on the question of whether ius gentium was conceived as natural law or
positive law. The fact is that.., it has been both, as well as the product of a sort of reflective equilibrium between the two.").
87 Id. at
138.
88 Id. at
143.
89 At least this is the conventional
understanding. See, e.g., LEE SMOLIN, THE
TROUBLE WITH PHYSIcs: THE RISE OF STRING THEORY, THE FALL OF A SCIENCE, AND
WHAT COMES NEXT 289-307 (2006). This is not to say that scientists do not have fundamental disagreements. For an account of the recent controversy over string theory
and its relationship to the question of "what science is," see generally SMOLIN, supra.
86
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sensus signifies, and, in the scientific context,
a consensus signifies a
9
0
are.
actually
things
how
of
description
correct
We do not have that kind of agreement on how to go about resolving moral disagreements, and this in turn means that our attitude toward moral consensus should be different from our attitude toward
scientific consensus. Unlike in the scientific field, there is no agreedupon methodology for resolving disagreements in the moral context.
Some would invoke God, others would invoke rights, yet others might
invoke utility, and there is no agreement on how such different worldviews are to be sorted out when we wrestle with moral questions. 9'
What this in turn means is that when we do see a moral agreement, it
is unclear how we ought to treat it because we do not have an account
of how it is that the process that created the moral agreement in question reflects the moral reality, analogous to the way a scientific consensus is thought to reflect physical reality. 92 The problem is acute,
even if we assume that the international consensus against thejuvenile
death penalty is in fact a moral consensus, since it is unclear whethef
expressions of international consensus really have to do with "moral

90See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 136 (1985)
("In
a scientific inquiry there should ideally be convergence on an answer, where the best
explanation of the convergence involves the idea that the answer represents how
things are ....");see also Susan Haack, Coherence, Consistency, Cogency, Congruity, Cohesiveness, &c.: Remain Calm! Don't Go Overboard!, 35 NEW LITERARY HIST. 167, 178
(2004) ("[T]he fact that scientists agree on a theory doesn't warrant it; gradually killing off those who don't accept a new scientific idea, or playing a tape repeating 'the
earth moves' under the pillows of the holdouts while they sleep, won't make the claim
in question any more likely true. No: consensus in the scientific community is epistemologically significant because-by no means always, but on the whole and in the long
run, often enough-the strong evidence that warrants the theory also explains scientists' agreement.").
91 This is something that Waldron himself has persuasively
laid out. Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevanceof Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 158, 171-76 (Robert
P. George ed., 1992).
92 See RESCHER, supra note 27, at 14 ("From the angle of
rationality it will only be a
rationally engendered consensus that is significant: and what is significant about it is
not its consensuality but its rationality."); WILLIAMS, supra note 90, at 136 ("[E]ven if
[ethical convergence] happens, it will not be correct to think it has come about because convergence has been guided by how things actually are ....
");Norman Daniels,
Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J. PHIL. 256, 275 (1979)
("[Some worry that] there may be consensus on moral falsehoods. The worry is clearly
reasonable when we suspect that the factors that led to consensus have little, if anything, to do with rational inquiry....").
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agreements" as opposed to a more complex set 93of national interests
that have only marginally to do with moral truths.
To further illustrate, consider another current debate in which4
the argument from "consensus" is frequently made: global warming.9
In the debates over climate change, there are two types of debates:
scientific debates and policy debates. The scientific debate is about
whether "global warming" is a real phenomenon and whether there is
a gradual warming of the earth that is being caused by human activishould be done about global
ties. 95 The policy debate is about what
96
warming if it is a real phenomenon.
Whether there are genuine disagreements in the scientific community on the issue of global warming, or whether those disagreements have been invented by those with political agendas, is not the
important issue here.97 What is important for the purposes of the Article is the difference between the two types of debates. What makes
scientific disagreements fundamentally different from policy disagreements is that policy disagreements in the global warming context
frequently implicate moral questions (which need to be distinguished
from pragmatic, empirical, predictive questions about how to get from
point A to point B).9s In the global warming context, difficult moral
judgments must be made on questions such as what the correct balance between development and environmental protection is, what we
owe to future generations, when and whether it is legitimate to impose economic sacrifices on one particular group of people for the
benefit of the overall population, whether developed countries and
9'As an example, consider the various forces that led to drafting and ratification
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, discussed in LAWRENCEJ. LEBLANC, THE
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 25-62 (1995). See also sources cited supra
note 73.
94See, e.g.,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP
I,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS (J.T. Houghton et al., eds. 2001) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE]; PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 357-81 (2d ed. 2003); PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 523-33 (2d ed. 2002); Peter Doran, Cold, HardFacts,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2006, at A25; Gregg Easterbrook, Finally Feelingthe Heat, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2006, at A27.
95 MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE
AND ASSESSMENT 3-26

(1999).
96

97

Id. at 27-114.
See TIM FLANNERY, THE WEATHER MAKERS:

How MAN IS CHANGING THE CLIMATE AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR LIFE ON EARTH 238-46 (2005); ELIZABETH KOLBERT,
FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE, AND CLIMATE CHANGE 159-72

(2006).
98 See KOLBERT, supranote
97, at 141-47.
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developing countries have different responsibilities, and so on."
"[T]he tangled issues of culpability and responsibility" that Waldron
refers to in the juvenile death penalty context ' ® are more like policy
disagreements than scientific disagreements in the global warming
context, with all their accompanying methodological problems.
It is important to be clear about what I am not claiming. I am not
highlighting moral disagreements and invoking the differences between ethics and science in order to question the existence of objective moral reality itself,' 0' to argue in favor of moral relativism,0 2 or
even to argue that the only kind of knowledge we should treat as
genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge, or at least something that
shares those features of scientific knowledge that make it "scientific." 0 3 Neither am I making the positive argument that moral
agreements, even when they happen, are always accidental or meaningless.
Rather, the point is this. The only question here is over the significance of consensus on a moral question. In order to understand
the significance of a consensus, we need to examine the procedure by
which the consensus is arrived at. (For example, if a consensus is produced through coercion, that would be a reason to dismiss it.) And
understanding the procedure entails understanding how the procedure handles and resolves disagreements if they arise. So, for the
purposes of this section, we should note the differences between
moral agreements and scientific agreements in order to assess the argument that the international consensus on the morality of the juvenile death penalty can be analogized to a scientifically established
piece of knowledge. The force of the analogy comes from the fact
that, on scientific matters, it would be unthinkable, as Waldron argues, for someone to start out without first asking what the current
state of scientific knowledge on the matters is. And I have been argu99 FLANNERY, supra note 97, at 230; KOLBERT, supra note 97, at 155-57. See generally

ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (Robert Elliot ed., 1995).
100Waldron, supra note 3,
at 143.
101SeeJ .L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 15-49 (1977).
102 SeeGILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY
3-10 (1977).
,0. CompareJohn McDowell, Projection and Truth in Ethics, in MORAL DISCOURSE
AND
PRACTICE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 215, 222 (Stephen Darwall et al. eds.,
1997) (criticizing the view that "natural science has a foundational status in philosophical reflection about truth-that there can be no facts other than those that would
figure in a scientific understanding of the world") with Brian Leiter, Objectivity, Morality,
and Adjudication, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 66, 67, 71-72, 77-78 (Brian Leiter
ed., 2001) (defending what he calls the "Naturalistic Conception" of objectivity).
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ing that that is because we have confidence that science is the enterprise of describing the physical world as it is and the participants
agree on a method and its tight connection to that enterprise. When
we look at the moral realm, we lack such confidence because there is
no similar understanding of a procedure that is designed to help us
attain moral knowledge. Therefore, the reasons why a scientist would
not ignore the current state of scientific knowledge in embarking on a
scientific quest do not readily apply to the moral realm.
C. Aesthetic Consensus
Here we consider another analogy. Justice Thomas argued that
the "Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans, " 104 and Waldron
makes the point of distinguishing ius gentium from "foreign moods,
fads, or fashions." 105 Now what is it about "moods, fads, or fashions"
that is so objectionable? I argue in this section that the disparagement of aesthetic judgments implied in both Justice Thomas's dismissal and Waldron's distancing is in fact unwarranted. There are
features of aesthetic judgments that make them appropriate as a useful analogy for our purposes. The aesthetic analogy presents a model
as to how and why one may engage with, and even defer to, others'
judgments that conflict with one's own. Comparing the norm-centric
analysis in the juvenile death penalty context against the process of
consulting others' aesthetic judgments raises some doubts about the
norm-centric analysis.
Suppose that I participate as a judge in a film festival, and it turns
out that there is a broad consensus among the participants as to how
different films should be ranked, but that my own ranking departs
from it significantly. I may have one of several reactions. I might decide that although my taste in films is different from everyone else's, it
is nothing to worry about since there is nothing wrong with having a
different taste. Or I might think that my taste is different from everyone else's, and that means there is something wrong with me, and I
should therefore try to change what I think about different films and
bring it in line with what everyone else thinks. Or I might wonder why
it is that other people experience these films differently from the way I

104 Foster

v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in de-

nial of certiorari).
105
Waldron, supra note 3, at 144.
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experience them and use it as an occasion to deepen my understanding of this art form.
Which of the three should be one's reaction when one'sjudgment
about film differs from the prevailing "consensus," and can we analogize the answers to the norm-centric analysis in the juvenile death
penalty context? The first possibility calls for disregarding others'
judgments as irrelevant to one's judgment and is thus no support for
the norm-centric analysis. Perhaps this was the sentiment that Justice
Thomas expressed when he dismissed foreign experiences as "moods,
fads, or fashions." 16 But the other two possibilities seem to be more
promising from the perspective of the norm-centric analysis.
So then what about the second possibility? When would the act of
deferring to others make sense in the aesthetic context? There may
be two situations when such a reaction is warranted-first, when one is
a novice when it comes to films and, second, when one is comparing
notes with those who are believed to be experts. In the two contexts,
the bare fact of consensus among those who are experienced or
knowledgeable about an issue by itself should weigh significantly for
those less experienced or knowledgeable. Even asking what is behind
the consensus may be a waste of time and effort for some beginners
because they may not know enough to understand the reasoning
process that drives experts to their judgments. For those beginners,
the proper way of increasing one's knowledge is simply through blind
emulation, the way one learns to play music at first through imitation.
The problem for the norm-centric model is that neither situation
seems analogous to the relationship between the United States and
the rest of the world on the issue of the juvenile death penalty.
First, the United States is not new to the issue of the death penalty. Of course, if there is some moral problem that we are not familiar with, but we know that others have more experience grappling
with, it may make sense to consider deferring to others and bringing
one's judgment in line with others, at least until we accumulate our
own experience with the matter. For instance, after the 9/11 attacks,
the issue of how we ought to strike the liberty-security balance became
more urgently important to us than in our recent past, and it made
sense to look to other countries with more recent experiences dealing
with those issues, such as Israel and England, and to learn from

10F
Foster,537 U.S. at 990 n.*.
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them. 10 7 Similarly, new technologies raise new moral questions, and
we are accustomed to encountering issues we had not fully thought
through in the context of bio- and medical ethics all the time."' In
such situations, we may look around and seek wisdom from others by
asking what kinds of judgments they have reached in dealing with
similar issues.
But the problem of the juvenile death penalty is not "new" in that
sense. Death penalty issues are heavily litigated year after year in the
United States. Thanks to Supreme Court involvement with the death
penalty since Furman v. Georgia, 09 there is no shortage of cases, law review articles, conferences, books, and editorials on the morality of the
death penalty. The Supreme Court decides a handful of death penalty cases every term, and such decisions are often on the front pages
of major newspapers. It is possible that we Americans, for some reason or another, repeatedly end up making decisions that cannot be
defended as a moral matter. And it is also likely that there is a lot of
misinformation and bad argumentation on this topic, and maybe even
some sentiments that are correctly characterized as "barbaric." But
unfamiliarwith the moral ins and outs of the issues, we are not.
Similarly, although, as mentioned, one can imagine a person who
decides to defer to a well-regarded film critic or at least to emulate the
critic's taste, the United States does not stand in that kind of relationship to the rest of the world. There is no reason to believe that the
rest of the world has moral expertise in this area, such that it would
make sense for us to attempt to emulate them in the way an amateur
cultivates his or her own skills and instincts by emulating an expert.

107

See, e.g., Kent Roach, Must We Trade Rights for Security? The Choice Between Smart,

Harsh, or ProportionateSecurity Strategiesin Canadaand Britain,27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2151,
2155 (2006) ("The United Kingdom has had much experience with terrorism and is an
influential innovator with respect to anti-terrorism laws."); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British, and Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L.
REv. 1906, 1908 (2004) ("Fighting terrorism poses challenges that are essentially new
(or newly recognized) for America. For that reason, it is worth considering the experience of Western democracies that confronted grave terrorist threats over extended
periods before September 11, 2001.").
108SeeJackson, supra note 12, at 320 (discussing the value of "international experience" in dealing with issues raised by the emergence of new technologies); Tushnet,
Knowing Less, supra note 12, at 1278 n.9 ("The time may soon come when non-U.S.
courts will grapple with novel issues-such as the regulation of genetic engineeringbefore U.S. courts do. The non-U.S. courts may provide some insights that would be
useful when the U.S. courts later consider constitutional issues arising out of the same
social phenomena.").
109408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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Some of us may believe that Europeans are more civilized than we are
as a general matter, and that we should mimic their ways of dealing
with juvenile offenders. But it is not at all clear how such an assumption can be demonstrated in a way that does not beg the question.
What about, then, the last possibility? When my judgment of film
differs from others', I may try to understand why by inquiring into why
others came to the assessments that they did. I can ask people why
they ranked the films the way they did-what about these films they
liked or disliked. After having dialogues about the merits of different
films-about their plot, script, acting, look, music, originality, emotional impact, insight, and so on-I may still disagree with others'
rankings, but at least I will have a better understanding of specifically
how others' experiences of these films differed from mine. And, depending on whether their explanations resonate with my own aesthetic standards, I may or may not decide to reconsider my thinking
on the subject. Of course, the analogy works whether we are talking
about film or other contexts in which similar judgments of beauty are
made, such as in fine art, music, and literature.110
Should we think about the debate over foreign materials as being
analogous to these sorts of comparisons?"' Questions about desert,
culpability, and responsibility are frequently vexing, and when we notice that other countries have blanket prohibitions on the juvenile
death penalty, we can consult their legal materials and ask what the
rationale behind such prohibitions is. The fundamental moral question we face is how to think through issues of desert when a child under the age of eighteen commits a crime so evil and heinous that the
death penalty becomes a live option as an appropriate response. It

110 For more examples of how we make evaluations of various kinds, see Joseph

Raz, Notes on Values and Objectivity, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS, supra note 103,
at 194, 223 (discussing humor and music). There is a large philosophical literature on
how to make sense of aesthetic judgments. See, e.g., DAVID HUME, Of the Standard of
Taste, in ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 226 (Eugene F. Miller ed., Liberty
Fund 1985) (1777). For useful overviews, see, for example, John W. Bender, Aesthetic
Realism 2, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AESTHETICS 80 Uerrold Levinson ed., 2003);
Richard Eldridge, Aesthetics and Ethics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AESTHETICS, supra, at 722 (Jerrold Levinson ed. 2003); Robert Stecker, Value in Art, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF AESTHETICS, supra, at 307 (Jerrold Levinson ed. 2003); Nick Zangwill,
Aesthetic Realism 1, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AESTHETICS, supra, at 63.
I Vicki Jackson's suggestion that "constitutional law can be understood as a site
of engagement between domestic law and international or foreign legal sources and
practices" seems similar to this model. Jackson, supra note 3, at 114; see also Choudhry,
supra note 12, at 835-38 (describing what he calls the "dialogical use of comparative
legal materials"); Harding, supra note 12, at 424-27 (describing the "dialogic model").
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seems clear that youth makes a difference, but in what way?112 Is there
some understanding that one should not be held fully responsible for
one's acts if they do not flow from a fully formed character? Do we
believe that children under the age of eighteen are not able to control
their impulses as well as adults can, and should that make a difference? l l3 As we attempt to come to grips with issues like this, we can
benefit from looking at how other countries have thought through
similar issues.
This is an attractive and plausible picture, but the problem is that
it does not apply to the relevant debate. In order for the kind of engagement that I described to happen, there has to be a way to talk to
different people behind the consensus about the reasons for their
votes. What the Supreme Court does in cases like Roper is not like
that. As I have been emphasizing, the Court engages in norm-centric,
not reason-centric analyses. There is no dialogue, and there is no engagement with other countries' rationales. And, for that matter, as I
describe in more detail below in Part IV, it is not even clear how one
should go about finding "the rationale" behind an international consensus against the juvenile death penalty.
In sum, analogizing the process of consulting foreign legal materials to consulting others' aesthetic judgments does not help us defend the Supreme Court's use of foreign legal materials in its constitu112

The Roper Court had its own answer to this question when it conducted its pro-

portionality analysis. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (stating that
youth is highly correlated with recklessness, susceptibility to peer pressure, and lack of
fixed character). For some general discussions about the issue of culpability of juvenile offenders, see ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 36-41 (2005); ZIMRING, supra note 64, at 49-69,

193-218; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective onjurisdictional Boundary, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF
ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT 379, 393-99 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000); Fagan, supra note 64, at 207. Cf Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 1 (1962), reprinted in FREE WILL 72, 88 (Gary Watson ed., 2d
ed. 2003).
1
The issue of culpability of juvenile offenders is, of course, connected to
the
broader issue of culpability generally and the debate between "choice" theorists and
"character" theorists. For a representative discussion, see NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 58-78 (1988); Peter Arenella, Character,Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Characterto Our Moral Culpability Judgments, in CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY 59 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds.
1990); R.A. Duff, Choice, Character,and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345 (1993);
H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 136 (1968); Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General
Theory, 12 LAW & PHIL. 193 (1993); Michael Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, in
CRIME, CULPABILITY, AND REMEDY, supra, at 29.
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tional decisions, although not necessarily for the reasons implied by
Justice Thomas's dismissal of the whole business as an imposition of
"foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans." As philosophers
have noticed, there are instructive parallels between aesthetic judgments and moral judgments." 4 Thinking about the Supreme Court
practice of consulting other countries' laws can benefit from the analogy to aesthetic judgments, as the analogy suggests in what situations
it would be appropriate to defer to or engage with others' opinions.
None of those situations, however, apply to the present controversy
over the use of foreign laws in constitutional interpretation, at least in
the Eighth Amendment context.
D. Moral Consensus
Finally, instead of drawing analogies to an aesthetic consensus or a
scientific consensus, what if we just treat the consensus against the juvenile death penalty the way it looks-as a moral consensus? In other
words, what should be the significance of an international moral consensus for our evaluation of the juvenile death penalty?
The short answer to this question is that there is no significance
because a consensus could always be wrong. 1 This is not an idle objection. The institution of slavery, for instance, was supported by ius
gentium after all. " 6 At the same time, the objection is too easy and too
quick-and hence easy to dismiss with the simple rebuttal, "Of course
it could be wrong and why would anybody deny that?" Consensus, of
course, is no guarantee of truth. But neither the objection that consensus can be wrong, nor the rebuttal that nobody thinks that consensus is a guarantee of truth, sufficiently acknowledges the rhetorical
force carried by consensus. It is unrealistic as a matter of everyday
moral reasoning to believe that consensus has no significance in one's
moral deliberation. The question is what the significance is.
In order to get at the question of the epistemic significance of
consensus on moral issues, consider the following. Say I belong to an
association called the "Dignity Society," the members of which all
place a high value on human dignity. I am a member of the association because I find that the members hold the values that I hold and
that I have similar moral instincts as they do on various issues. They
See, e.g., Eldridge, supra note 110; Zangwill, supra note 110, at 74-78.
Waldron, supra note 3, at 139.
116Id. at 134; Alan Watson, Seventeenth-Century Jurists, Roman Law, and the Law
of
Slavery, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1343, 1354 (1993).
114
115
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are, in short, a group of like-minded people with whom I identify on
moral issues. Consider further that I one day realize that my view on
assisted suicide differs from the others in the group. There is a near
unanimous consensus in the group that assisted suicide is as a categorical matter immoral and in violation of human dignity. And let's
say I happen to hold the view that assisted suicide should be allowed
precisely because I take human dignity seriously.
In this situation, it is clear that the mere fact of consensus should
weigh heavily in my own moral deliberation. If people whose values I
share and whose judgments I respect uniformly reach a conclusion
different from mine, that is a reason for me to lose confidence in my
own judgment and reexamine it, asking myself where I went wrong in
my moral deliberation. (Here, we have to be careful not to confuse
such loss of confidence in one's judgment with the pressure to conform that arises from a desire for approval and/or a fear of being
shunned or socially isolated.) It is possible that I will still end up disagreeing with them on the issue in the end, but, by the end of that rethinking process, I should have gone through some adjustments in my
thinking, either in my view about assisted suicide or in my more general views about dignity.117
Similarly, if I am unsure about a moral issue that implicates dignity concerns, I could proceed by surveying the members of the Dignity Society or I could come to a tentative conclusion about the issue
and then seek to confirm it with others in the Society. The idea
should be familiar and should not require a construct as fanciful as
the "Dignity Society." We all have experiences of consulting members
of various groups we belong to in order to test our intuitions about
one matter or another. So this is one context in which "consensus" is
epistemically significant. This discussion explains a situation in which
we may take a consensus seriously. It seems to me that the vision is
perfectly intelligible, and it explains why the mere existence of consensus can sometimes powerfully guide one's moral deliberation one
way or the other. However, the situation I described here does not
apply to the problem that this Article addresses.
Consider the following statements made by the Roper Court: "the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty";1 18 "[a]rticle 37 of the

117 1 have in mind a process akin to that described in John Rawls' description of
"reflective equilibrium." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 20 (1971).
118 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).

2007]

INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS AS PERSUASIVE AUFTHORITY

101

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which every
country in the world has ratified save for the United States and Somalia, contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes
committed by juveniles under 18";" 9 "the United States now stands
alone in a world that has turned its face against the juvenile death
penalty."1 2' The Coker plurality, too, made note of how widespread the
agreement on the issue of the death penalty for rape was when it
stated that "out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965,
only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue," citing a UN study on capital punishment.12' And in Atkins, the
Court referred to "the world community," in which "the imposition of
by mentally retarded offendthe death penalty for crimes committed
122
ers is overwhelmingly disapproved."
These statements do not stress that those who share values that are
common to ours have reached a conclusion contrary to ours. The
emphasis is actually in the opposite direction: the juvenile death penalty is one of those norms that transcend cultural differences, and
countries with different moral, cultural, and religious backgrounds all
have reached an agreement on this particular issue. This, too, is a
type of consensus, but one's attitude toward this kind of consensus
should differ from my attitude toward a consensus from members of
the hypothetical Dignity Society. The significance of the Dignity Society's consensus lies in the fact that those who share my moral premises
have reached a uniform conclusion on some matter, and, if it turns
out my conclusion differs from the consensus view, it makes sense to
question how I can hold the Dignity Society's premises and the particular moraljudgment in question without contradicting myself. But
the "culturally transcendent" or "cross-cultural" consensus that the
Roper, Atkins, and Coker courts appear to appeal to does not have that
feature. What is significant about the consensus is precisely that those
with wildly varying moral premises and outlooks have come to an
agreement on this particular issue.
This kind of consensus, too, carries a special kind of force, but the
question again is why and how it applies to the current debate. Let
me examine several possibilities. The first possibility I will call the
"Wisdom of Crowds" argument. The basic idea is this: individuals

Id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
121Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,596 n.10 (1977) (plurality opinion).
12 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317
n.21 (2002).
11
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have biases that come from their particular makeup and places in society. But aggregate those individuals' judgments together, and the
group's collective judgment is often better than any particular individual's judgment within the group. 123 This is a familiar idea with
numerous variants over time, 124 such as the saying, "Two heads are better than one"; John Stuart Mill's discussion of the value of diversity in
truth finding 125 ("the marketplace of ideas"); and even, at least according to some, the adversary system. 116
Of course these are all very different ideas, but there is at least a
family resemblance among them in a way that is relevant to the idea of
objectivity and truth. One way of explaining why these decision procedures are likely to bring one closer to the right answer is that they
eliminate biases that interfere with truth-finding. In this sense, they
occupy the flipside of various moral theories, or, if "theory" is too
strong, moral devices, whose appeal lies in their commitment to the
pursuit of right answers through elimination of biases and distortions
that result from one's particular, limited perspective. Plato's allegory
of the cave warns of such distortions, 117 and the impulse to rid oneself
of such distortions by taking a transcendent, unbiased, and objective
viewpoint is evident in Kant's moral philosophy 12 as well as in contemporary formulations
like "the veil of ignorance" 29 and "the view
130
from nowhere."'
I say that the first group of ideas and the second group of ideas
are two sides of the same coin because they are both importantly
123

See generallyJAMES SUROIECKI,

THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004); see also Posner
& Sunstein, supra note 12 (applying the Condorcet Jury Theorem to the foreign laws
debate).
124 See Thomas Kelly, The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement, in 1 OXFORD
STUDIES
IN EPISTEMOLOGY 167, 191 (Tamar Szab6 Gendler &John Hawthorne eds., 2005) (discussing the view that diversity of views leads to better information); Aviezer Tucker, The
Epistemic Significance of Consensus, 46 INQUIRY 501, 506-12 (2003) (arguing that a "heterogeneous consensus" is a uniquely reliable source of true beliefs).
.25JOHN

STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprinted in ON LIBERTY 5, 19-55 (Stefan

Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
126

Cf ROBERT NOZICK, INVARIANCES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIVE
WORLD

94-95 (2001) (raising the possibility that including two biased jurors-one for each
side-in each jury may result in more accurate decisions in the long run, as opposed to
having each jury be composed of twelve unbiased jurors).
127 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 220-51 (G.R.F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
128 See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
3-5 (Lewis White Beck

trans., Macmillan Publishing Co. 1956) (1788).
M RAwqS, sulna note 117, at 136-42.
10

THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 3-12, 138-43 (1986).
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driven by the idea of elimination of bias. One main difference between the two groups is that the first group of theories eliminates biases by throwing all of them in one place and having them cancel
each other out, whereas the second group of theories envisions the
process of abstracting oneself away from one's particularities in order
to attain a clearer perspective. But the goal is the same: arrival at an
unbiased perspective. The appeal of these ideas is clear and familiar,
and it seems plausible that some of the persuasive force of citation of
an international consensus against a penal practice may derive from
the idea of reaching the right answer by finding an idea that has been
scrutinized from various perspectives and still survived.
I do not mention all these theories in order to criticize them but
only to explore the epistemic appeal of an answer that comes out of a
process in which various perspectives are represented. The question is
whether this model is applicable in this context. There are three
problems with this account here. First, it is not clear that the international consensus reflects a moral consensus, as opposed to, say, simply
an opportunity for countries to express to each other how civilized
and committed to human rights they are, whether or not they actually
believe in the content of whatever they are signing onto. 131 Second, as
I have stated above, 132given our lack of clear understanding as to what
decision procedure can bring us closer to the moral truth, we do not
have sufficient grounds to trust the outcome of whatever surveys the
Court has taken as a moral truth.
Third, there is a deeper problem here that is actually a specific
form of the general worry about whether this is the right way to go
about finding moral truths. The fact that different countries with
wildly divergent moral, religious, and cultural perspectives can agree
on the norm against the juvenile death penalty may signal that once
we eliminate various biases that result from our particular perspective,
the objective view delivers the conclusion that the juvenile death penalty is wrong. But there is something very odd about this argument.
The idea of supplying an unbiased answer by seeking an area of
agreement among people from different perspectives crucially relies
on the notion of what is and is not relevant in a particular inquiry. On
politically contentious scientific issues like global warming and evolution, we would rightly be suspicious of "scientific" conclusions ad

131

See Hathaway, supra note 73, at 2002-20 (describing the "expressive role" of

human rights treaties).
132 See supra Part IIlA-C.
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vanced by ideologically biased groups because one's politics should
have no bearing on such scientific truths. If you want to know
whether there is a real estate bubble that could pop in six months, it
would not make sense to listen only to real estate brokers because they
have a stake in sustaining a certain version of reality whether or not it
correctly reflects the empirical reality. And one has a good reason to
distrust wine ratings given out by magazines whose advertising revenues. are
dependent on the makers of the wines that are being re133
viewed.
Perhaps one way of correcting such biases is to aggregate
judgments given by people with biases in all directions and see where
they come out.
This is all well and good, but what exactly are the biases that are
being cancelled out (or abstracted from) in the juvenile death penalty
context? People from different moral, religious, and cultural perspectives get together and agree that the juvenile death penalty is a terrible business. It is one thing to eliminate biases that are irrelevant to
truth-seeking, but the "biases" that are being canceled out are precisely the kinds of biases that one needs to hold onto in order to naigate through a moral landscape.
If I happen to be against torture
for deontological reasons, the additional knowledge that consequentialists are also against torture does not increase the strength of my
moral conviction on the basis that any view that survived the process
of deontologists' and consequentialists' biases "canceling each other
out" is somehow "more objective" and "free from bias." That is like
saying that a Newtonian physicist's belief in some feature about the
universe is strengthened by the additional knowledge that an Aristotelian physicist happens to believe in it too. One's moral, religious, and
cultural background forms one's moral universe and is directly relevant to the moral inquiry one might make; such background is not
some "bias" that needs to be "cancelled out" or "eliminated" in order
to reach the moral truth of the matter. It is in fact just the opposite;
elimination of such biases is a good way of losing one's way around
the moral map.135
133 See Gary Rivlin, In Vino Veritas?, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2006, § 3, at I (reporting
on the biases that affect ratings by major wine publications).
134 Cf ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY, at xii (1993) (dealing with

an extreme, absurd version of this problem-the claim that "the attempt to correct for
biases itself [is] a bias").
135 Cf NAGEL, supra note 130, at 140 ("As in metaphysics, so in the realm of practical reason the truth is sometimes best understood from a detached standpoint; but
sometimes it will be fully comprehensible only from a particular perspective within the
world."); WILLIAMS, supra note 90, at 110 (criticizing attempts "to see philosophical re-
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In other words, there is no reason to privilege the least common
denominators among different moral perspectives as more likely to be
moral truths than those that do not make it onto the list. It does
mean that it will be politically easier to build a coalition against thejuvenile death penalty than against torture, but that has nothing to do
with the moral worths of the practices themselves.
Perhaps the key to the idea of cross-cultural moral truths is not
that of objectivity or elimination of bias but that of universality or undeniability. That is, the best explanation of the fact that there is such
an overwhelming consensus on a norm might be that the convergence
reflects moral reality. 31 6 It is not that the least common denominator
of moral views reflects moral reality any better than others; it is just
that the reason there is convergence around certain ideas is because
certain truths are "self-evident" or "undeniable." Certain moral truths
might be thought to be so obvious as to need no further justification,
and that is why it would be wrong to think the convergence around
such truths to be meaningless or accidental. 137 And such truths need
not exhaust the universe of moral truths; they could just be the minimum required for a moral society.l13 The key idea here is not consensus but the obvious rightness of such truths.

flection in ethics as a jump to the universalistic standpoint" and the view that "the
theoretical reasonings of the cool hour can do without a sense of the moral shape of
the world, of the kind given in the everyday dispositions"); Raz, supra note 110, at 210
("Ideal convergence cannot be a requirement that rules out parochial concepts or removes them to a lesser status. Rather, settling the question of the status of parochial
concepts is necessary before one can establish what sort of convergence is necessary.").
136 Cf Joseph Raz, The Claims of Reflective Equilibrium,
25 INQUIRY 307, 327 (1982)
("It is not a person's divergence from others which would make him lose confidence in
some of his views. It is the fact that the best explanation of the fact that those others
converge away from him is that they converge around the truth.").
137 Consider a similar point by
Nagel:
Although no single objective principle of practical reason like egoism or utilitarianism covers everything, the acceptance of some objective values is unavoidable-not because the alternative is inconsistent but because it is not
credible. Someone who, as in Hume's example, prefers the destruction of the
whole world to the scratching of his finger may not be involved in a contradiction or in any false expectations, but there is something the matter with him
nonetheless ....
NAGEL, supra note 130, at 154-55 (citation omitted).
1'4 Cf THOMAS NAGEL, Williams: Resisting Ehical
Theory, in OTHER MINDS: CRITICAL ESSAYS 1969-1994 at 174, 180 (1995) ("[T]heoretical principles may be universal
without being totalitarian; they may handle some conflicts of values without handling
them all. They can be regulative, allowing room for a great deal of pluralism and culturally determined ethical variation within the framework that they define.").
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I do not deny the existence of such truths. I would consider the
belief that slavery is immoral to qualify as one such truth. However, I
doubt that the Roper court faced the kind of question that could be
answered by reference to an obvious moral truth needing no further
explanation. To be sure, the case implicated some moral principles
that I would consider difficult to deny, such as: "One should not be
blamed for something for which one is not responsible," or, "One
should not inflict pointless suffering on another," or, 'Juvenile offenders are less culpable than adult offenders." But the question is
how such principles could translate to concrete decisions like Roper.
Here it should be remembered that although the Roper case is frequently referred to as the 'juvenile death penalty" case, it is more accurate to call it "the sixteen- and seventeen-year-old death penalty
case," given that this was the only group of offenders whose status
changed through the Roper ruling. Before Roper, it was already unconstitutional to impose the death penalty on juveniles--defined as offenders who were younger than sixteen at the time of the crime.' 39
Therefore, the question that the Roper Court faced was not whether
the death penalty can ever be imposed on five-year-olds, which seems
obviously problematic. Rather, the question the Court had to decide
was a line-drawing question: Should the line be drawn at sixteen or
eighteen? 140
This question, in turn, was framed in terms of line drawing, as opposed to standard setting, by the Court in its previous decisions, such
as Coker and Thompson. When the Court held in Coker that death was
disproportionately harsh for the crime of rape, Justice Powell dissented in part on the basis that "a bright line between murder and all
rapes-regardless of the degree of brutality of the rape or the effect
upon the victim" may not be "appropriate"14 and criticized the plurality for "not limit[ing] its holding to the case before [the Court] or to
similar cases."'4 2 Similarly, when the Court held in Thompson that
those who commit a crime at the age of fifteen or younger were not
deserving of death, Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment only.

139

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that "the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16
years of age at the time of his or her offense").
140 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005)
(discussing several concerns with
line drawing and the practical differences between sixteen- and eighteen-year-olds).
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and
dissenting in part).
142 Id. at 601 (Powell,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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She did so despite her agreement with the premise that "adolescents
are generally less blameworthy than adults who commit similar
crimes" because she did not think the specific conclusion followed
that "all 15-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpability that would
justify the imposition of capital punishment."4 3 Justice O'Connor still
voted to vacate the sentence because the State of Oklahoma had not
set a minimum age at which one could be sentenced to death. What
Justice O'Connor wanted to see from legislatures was not necessarily
the correct line, but rather "the earmarks of careful consideration" regarding the relative culpability
ofjuveniles in deciding at what age the
44
line should be drawn. 1
As this discussion illustrates, it is naive to think that general moral
propositions about the relative culpability of juveniles necessarily require the holding of the Roper case.•14 In order for them to be implemented, such moral principles have to be further specified with the
aid of additional normative, pragmatic, and empirical considerations
that are sensitive to specific factors present in the American criminal
justice system and its relationship to the society it inhabits. Factors to
consider include our history of slavery and racism,146 our jury system
(which requires that the jury, not the judge, must find the factors warranting the imposition of capital punishment) ,' 4 our federal system of
government, our understanding of the proper role of the judiciary in
setting limitations on punishment, our confidence in whether the
democratic process can accurately reflect the values that society does
or should hold, when and
whether over- and underenforcement is
48
appropriate, and so on.

143

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 853 (O'Connor, I., concurring in the judgment).

144 Id. at 857.

Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("General propositions do not decide concrete cases.").
146 For a discussion of the relationship between Coker and racial disparity, see, for
145

example, RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 323-26 (1997); Barbara Holden-Smith, Inherently Unequal.Justice: InterracialRape and the Death Penalty, 86J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1571, 1572-73 (1996) (reviewing ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE
SEVEN: RACE, RAPE, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1995)); Charles j. Ogletree, Jr., Black
Man's Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. REv. 15, 27-28 (2002).
147 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589
(2002).
148 For a discussion of the kinds of particular considerations that should
go into
deciding the line-drawing issue, see Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Defending Categorical Exemptions to the Death Penalty: Reflections on the ABA 's Resolutions Concerningthe Execution of Juveniles and Persons with Mental Retardation, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89
(1998). See also sources cited supra note 64 (discussing the difficult issue of when
childhood ends and adulthood begins for the purposes of ascribing responsibility for
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The argument is not that obvious, undeniable moral truths take
only the form of general principles that need further specification in
order to be action guiding-although in the juvenile death penalty
context, I would argue that the principles implicated are not specific
enough to decide the Roper question. There could also be specific
situations in which one could confidently say that the death penalty
for that particular defendant for that particular crime is wrong.
The Court in Roper did not take either option, but instead specified a rule somewhere in the middle. The idea was not for the Court
to announce an undeniable principle, nor to announce a specific result that was obviously the only just result. Rather, the Court announced a general rule that was obvious as neither a general proposition nor a particular instance. As a result, its outcome cannot be
defended as a truth that no one could deny was a moral fixed point.
I consider one final possibility: John Rawls's idea of overlapping
consensus. An "overlapping consensus" refers to an agreement on
certain norms among people from different moral, religious, or cultural backgrounds, even if the individuals disagree with each other
about the reasons for endorsing such norms. 149 In fact, accounts of
drafting the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights confirm that
the Universal Declaration drafters designed it to be an agreement on
a set of rights, with the understanding that there may be disagreements over the ultimate philosophical justifications for such rights. As
Jacque Maritain observed, an apt description of the Universal Declaration is the statement, "[W] e agree about the rights but on condition that
no one asks us why."' 50 The drafters of the Universal Declaration were
quite conscious of the problem of diversity; the solution they reached
was to agree on rights, but to agree to disagree on reasons.1 5' The

acts). For a more general discussion about how deep, wide, narrow, or shallow constitutional decision making by the Supreme Court should be, see, for example, RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001); JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY (2006); SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME, supra note 33.
149JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 147 (1993); see also Charles Taylor, Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS 124, 124 (Joanne R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999).
150Jacques Maritain, Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 9, 9 (UNESCO ed., 1949).
151 See MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 77-78, 147, 221-22 (2001) (describing the
deliberate attempt on the part of the drafters to avoid any discussion of first principles); LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 6 (1990) ("The international expressions of
rights themselves claim no philosophical foundation, nor do they reflect any clear phi-
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question is whether this idea of an overlapping consensus provides
any justification for the persuasive force of international consensus
against the juvenile death penalty.152 I believe the answer is no.
An overlapping consensus is essentially a political device. 53 The
idea of an overlapping consensus is most powerful as a way of justifying political coercion and ensuring political stability among a group
that consists of people of diverse backgrounds, cultures, and belief systems.154 When a country resists following human rights norms because they are foreign to the country's culture, the existence of an
overlapping consensus on the norm can be used as a way to justify enforcing the norm against the country's will. However, in order for
overlapping consensus to be used this way, the requisite work to establish the ways in which the country's own belief system endorses the
overlapping consensus has to have been done.155 Overlapping consensus works as a justification of coercion only because the connections between the norm around which there is a consensus and
individual belief systems that constitute a polity have been made.

losophical assumptions; they articulate no particular moral principles or any single,
comprehensive theory of the relation of the individual to society.... The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, striving for a pronouncement that would appeal to diverse political systems governing diverse peoples.... shunned philosophical exploration."); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 78 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001) ("Instead of a substantive set of justifications explaining why human
rights are universal,.... the Universal Declaration ... simply takes the existence of
rights for granted ....");Maritain, supra note 150, at 10-11 ("I am quite certain that
my way of justifying belief in the rights of man and the ideal of liberty, equality and
fraternity is the only way with a firm foundation in truth. This does not prevent me
from being in agreement on these practical convictions with people who are certain
that their way ofjustifying them, entirely different from mine or opposed to mine, in
its theoretical dynamism, is equally the only way founded upon truth."); see a/so JACK
DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORYAND PRACTICE 40-43 (2d ed. 2003).
152 Perhaps when it comes to the norm against the juvenile
death penalty, which
specifies the minimum age of eighteen, the idea of "incompletely theorized agreement[s]"-agreements on particulars at the shallow level despite disagreements on
deep principles-is more appropriate, given the norm's concreteness. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 33, at 35 (emphasis omitted). For a discussion of the similarities and differences between the idea of incompletely theorized agreements and an
overlapping consensus, see id. at 46-48.
",'This statement needs to be refined, as Rawls was at pains to point out that there
was a difference between "overlapping consensus" and modus vivendi. And one of the
differences was that the contents of an overlapping consensus were moral and they
were endorsed on moral grounds, albeit from different perspectives. However, it is
also importantly limited in the sense that it is not meant to replace or compete with
any of the underlying comprehensive doctrines. RAWLS, supra note 149, at 147-48.
154

Id. at 148.

155SeeTaylor, supra note 149, at 137-38.
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In other words, the idea of overlapping consensus presupposes
consensus building around a set of norms that are arrived at through
different comprehensive doctrines. It does not make comprehensive
doctrines that drive one's endorsement of the norms themselves superfluous. Neither does it replace the process of endorsement of the
norms from the perspective of one's comprehensive doctrine. This
means that the process of endorsement of the norms-which, one
might say, is what the Roper Court was involved in-cannot be helped
along by the existence of the overlapping consensus itself. An overlapping consensus leaves moral convictions as they are.
The implications of those features of overlapping consensus for
the topic of this Article are as follows. First, even if foreign legal materials that form a consensus against the juvenile death penalty are seen
as a sort of overlapping consensus, the idea of an overlapping consensus is not designed to be used as a moral shortcut that makes our own
moral evaluations superfluous or even any easier. We have to ultimately make our own moral judgments about the practice of the juvenile death penalty. Second, it is possible that an overlapping consensus can indeed help us improve our moral deliberations, but only if we
are able to peek behind the consensus and see what it is based on, and
whether some of the reasons cited by other countries apply to us as
well. There may be some normative perspectives that would not fit
with our constitutional tradition, but then it would be a surprise if we
found that none of the reasons cited by other countries moved us in
our own moral deliberation. But, of course, what this process of looking behind the overlapping consensus requires is that the Court move
beyond the norm-centric analysis. As I have emphasized, the Court's
current practice is correctly characterized as the norm-centric, not
reason-centric, analysis. The next Part discusses why the Court is
unlikely to alter its current mode of analysis.

IV. NoRMs AND

REASONS

Arguments in Parts II and III repeatedly came to the conclusion
that citing foreign legal materials may make sense, but the instances in
which it makes sense require courts to engage with the reasons behind
comparative and international norms, as opposed to just norms. It is
legitimate to wonder, then, whether there is a real problem here.
Even though the Court's current practice may not be defensible, that
does not threaten the idea of consulting foreign materials, and courts
rarely perform up to standards articulated as ideals by academics anyway. Why not just say that the Supreme Court's practice of citing for-
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eign materials can be defended in theory, even if the practice often
falls short? That is, if the problem has to do with the norm-centric
analysis, as opposed to the practice of citing foreign sources in domestic constitutional adjudication generally, why does it not end the debate? In fact, commentators who defend the practice of citing foreign
sources• tend
to distance themselves from the actual Supreme Court
156
practice.
Is it not the case that all that the Supreme Court has to do
is to make the adjustment from the norm-centric analysis to the reason-centric analysis? Perhaps this is so, but there are two problems,
one having to do with the Supreme Court's judicial minimalism, and
the other having to do with the nature of foreign legal materials.
A. JudicialMinimalism and Foreign Law
In order for the Court to engage with other countries on why they
do not permit the juvenile death penalty and to consider other countries' rationales in relation to our own understanding of the Eighth
Amendment, the Court needs to come to grips with exactly what evil it
is that the ban on cruel and unusual punishments exists to prevent.
However, this is usually not the case. It is not just that Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence has the usual gaps, ambiguities, and conflicts that one sees in law generally. Rather, there is a willful refusal
on the part of the Court to commit itself to a theory of the Eighth
Amendment, and the doctrinal steps it goes through to justify its decisions are precisely designed for the Court to avoid the theoretical
questions as to why a penal practice should be prohibited, while seeking common ground on what should be prohibited among different
normative perspectives.
The Court's reluctance to commit to a theory of punishment, or a
theory of limits on punishments, in the capital and noncapital proportionality cases is evident in the doctrinal tests that the Court applies.
In the capital proportionality cases, when considering the constitutionality of a particular penal practice-say, executing juvenile offenders-the Court first undertakes a survey of attitudes of legislatures
and behaviors ofjuries to identify a national consensus on the practice

156

See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 3, at 146 ("1 am under no illusion, however, that

the practice of the Supreme Court in Rlper and in other cases actually answers to the
characterization I have given. Practice often falls short of theory--particularly when
the practitioners have not shown much awareness of the theory in question!" (footnote
omitted)).
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Second, the Court engages in an "independent proin question.
portionality analysis" to determine whether the Court agrees or disagrees with the consensus. 15 The first step is a culpability analysis in
which the Court compares the crime or criminal to what it considers
to be the worst category of crimes: first-degree murders committed by
sane adults of normal intelligence.159 The second step, in turn, coneither the retribution
siders whether the punishment would advance
60
punishment.
of
purposes
or deterrence
There are a number of unanswered questions about how these different steps are related to one another.16' But what is important for
our purposes is the Court's avoidance of engaging with deep philosophical issues about the purposes of punishment and what limitations
should be placed on it. 62 Roughly speaking, the Court looks around
the country and counts heads and then hands down announcements
like "neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders" in Roper,63
or "[w] e are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded
criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive
This way of proceeding enpurpose of the death penalty" in Atkins.
ables the Court to avoid the difficult task of sorting through the vexed
issue of what to do when retribution and deterrence theories give conflicting counsel, and how to strike a balance when there are conflicts.
A similar pattern prevails in the imprisonment context in the
Court's proportionality-in-sentencing jurisprudence. The case law in
this area is in flux, but the Court's resistance to theorizing is obvious
in the Court's latest decision in this area, Ewing v. California, which
held that a prison term of twenty-five years to life under California's
three-strikes law was not excessive for shoplifting by a repeatoffender. 65 The Ewing plurality reasoned that a "sentence can have a

157
158

159

See cases cited supra note 34.
See cases cited supra note 35.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-70 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.

304, 318 (2002); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157-58 (1987); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 797-98 (1982) (plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 589, 598
(1977) (plurality opinion).
160

Roper, 543 U.S. at 571-72; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-99.

For a more extended discussion, see Lee, supra note 30, at 691-92.
Ristroph, supra note 32, at 315 (describing the proportionality jurisprudence in the capital context as utilizing the "overlapping consensus" approach).
163 543 U.S. at 572.
164 536 U.S. at 321.
161

162 Cf

165

538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (plurality opinion).
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variety ofjustifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution,
or rehabilitation" and announced that a sentence is not unconstitutionally excessive if it can be justified under any one of the traditional
justifications of punishment.'66 In the Ewing case itself, the Court upheld the sentence on the grounds that the punishment "reflects a rational legislative judgment... that offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be
67
incapacitated." 1
Again, for the purposes of analysis, the point is to note the Court's
reluctance to adjudicate among conflicts among the traditional justifications of punishment. Rather, the Court simply asks whether some
purpose of punishment is being advanced by the punishment in question, and, if so, that is sufficient for the Court to uphold the punishment. In both capital and noncapital contexts, then, the Court appears reluctant to devise a theory of Eighth Amendment
proportionality that prioritizes one theory of punishment over the
others, and its jurisprudence is designed to find a path that allows it to
make decisions with minimal philosophical commitments.
Seen this way, the Court's jurisprudence here is a classic instance
of what Cass Sunstein has called "incompletely theorized agreements."' s The basic idea behind incompletely theorized agreements
is that when there are several deep theories available to guide our decisions in an area of law and those theories conflict, the Court often
avoids deciding deep questions and seeks areas of agreement among
the different theoretical perspectives. 9 In other words, the juvenile
death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment because retribution
theorists and deterrence theorists would agree-or at least so the
Court claims-that it does not serve the purpose of punishment, even
though they may disagree about what the purpose of punishment is.
Mentally retarded offenders, too, should be exempt from the death
penalty because the competing schools of thought on punishment can
agree on the proposition that mentally retarded offenders should not
be executed.
There are many reasons why the Supreme Court may find judicial
minimalism attractive and why it may be normatively desirable. 70 It is

16
167

Id. at 25.
Id. at 30.

168 SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note

Id.
170 See id. at 44-46.
169

33, at 37.
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beyond the scope of this Article to engage with this debate. The important thing is to see how this particular feature of Supreme Court
jurisprudence in this area of law complicates the debate over citation
of foreign laws. The recommendation that the Court engage with
other countries' judgments by considering the reasons behind the international consensus on various penal practices, which I believe
would be theoretically defensible, cannot be followed by the Court
unless it changes its usual way of doing things.
In other words, there is a reason why the Court engages in the
norm-centric, and not reason-centric, analysis, at least in this doctrinal
context. The Court counts heads, but does not ask why when it looks
at other countries. The Court has built Eighth Amendment jurisprudence so that it never has to answer the question why, or at least, it
never has to commit itself to a reason for banning one penal practice
or another, other than the reason that people with different theoretical commitments would agree on that particular outcome. The implication of the Court's tendency to avoid deep questions, count noses,
and seek incompletely theorized agreements for the debate on citations of foreign laws, then, is that the Court is unlikely to become the
kind of thoughtful, sophisticated comparativist that engages with
other legal systems envisioned by some scholars17 unless it moves away
from its judicial minimalist tendencies.
B. Costs of Focusing on Reasons
Another problem with the reason-centric analysis is that adopting
this analysis is not costless. The process of comparison with other
countries that focuses on reasons, as opposed to the norms that the
reasons support, requires that we work with foreign legal materials
that give reasons. Reason-centric analysis, as the name suggests, needs
reasons. Therefore, adopting the reason-centric analysis would make
unavailable a class of foreign legal materials that some would consider
too important for the Court to ignore.
Take Roper for instance. As discussed previously, the Court noted
that "the United States is the only country in the world that continues
to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty."' 17 2 The Court
also mentioned several human rights conventions, including the UN

171See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 3, at 114 (describing what she
calls the "engage-

ment" model).
172 Roper v.Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005).
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Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human
Rights, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child, all of which include a prohibition of the juvenile death penalty.173 The question is whether these foreign sources are susceptible
to the reason-centric analysis.
As discussed in Part III.A, countries may come to the view that the
juvenile death penalty should not be permitted for any number of
reasons. In order to conduct a proper reason-centric analysis, the
Court would have to explore why it is that different countries have
bans on the juvenile death penalty and consider whether such reasons
apply to our Eighth Amendment analysis. If there are different reasons why various countries believe the juvenile death penalty is undesirable, then the Court would have to engage with such different reasons separately.
This is not in itself a problem and, in fact, such a deliberative
process probably leads to more thoughtful decision making on the
part of the Supreme Court. But we should also be clear about what
the Court would be losing, which is the argumentative force that
draws on the existence of an overwhelming international consensus
on an issue. And this is because what matters in the reason-centric
analysis are the reasons behind the consensus, and not the fact of
prohibition or the fact of consensus itself. That there is an overwhelming consensus ceases to be so impressive unless the Court is able to
show that each country has converged on the same conclusion for the
same reason and that that same reason is also important to us.
Perhaps a more serious loss that comes with adopting the reasoncentric analysis is that it becomes more difficult to imagine what role
various international human rights treaties cited in cases like Roper can
play in constitutional interpretation. Human rights treaties, by design, leave theoretical issues of what justifies the rights they include
obscure and are more accurately described as products of an overlapping consensus.
In fact, this feature of human rights treaties is their strength, and
their purported lack of reliance on a "Western" metaphysics and
worldview is what has enabled them to fight off charges of cultural
imperialism. The issue of foundations of rights has dogged international human rights efforts from the beginning"14 and, as discussed

173
174

Id. at 576.
See the account contained in GLENDON, supra note 151, at 221-33.
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above, the philosophical solution adopted early on was to agree on
norms.175
norms, but to agree to disagree on reasons behind the
Documents of overlapping consensus seek agreement on concrete
norms without reconciling different grounds that people cite for
those norms. International human rights treaties are, therefore, willfully silent about the reasons behind the norms they adopt. What is
important is that different nations can reach an agreement on a set of
principles and norms, and the question why individual human rights
provisions might be a good idea remains for individual signatories to
determine.
This all means the reason-centric analysis, which is more defensible than the norm-centric analysis, is deeply incompatible with the way
in which the Supreme Court approaches Eighth Amendment cases
generally and an important set of foreign legal materials that may bear
on Eighth Amendment issues. Therefore, we have a theoretical dilemma. The norm-centric analysis is indefensible for many of the
aforementioned reasons, but adopting the reason-centric analysis is a
false alternative, which carries the potential loss of an important set of
foreign legal materials to draw on. The end result is that there are
reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects of the Court adopting a
form of comparative analysis in the Eighth Amendment context that
can be defended.
CONCLUSION

This Article examined the idea of international consensus against
a penal practice as persuasive authority in our interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment. This Article first addressed the issue under the
assumption that the Eighth Amendment should be read as a provision
that places retributivist limitations on our institution of punishment.
This Article then looked at the same issue without the retributivist assumption. The conclusion under either assumption is the same. The
existence of an international consensus against a penal practice
should not lead us to think one way or the other about the constitutionality of the penal practice under the Eighth Amendment, so long
as the Court stays with what this Article has called the norm-centric
analysis in consulting foreign sources. This Article also gave some reasons as to why the Court is unlikely to relinquish its current mode of

175 See supra text accompanying notes 149-151.
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analysis and explored some costs of giving up the norm-centric analysis and adopting the reason-centric analysis.
The conclusion this Article reached, however, is not all negative,
because the criticism here is confined to the Court's use of foreign authorities in Eighth Amendment proportionality cases like Atkins and
Roper. This Article's discussions have implications outside this narrow
context, and the flipside of every negative discussion here suggests a
defensible way of using foreign authorities, some of which, at least in
theory, can be adopted by the Court in various legal contexts.
For instance, as discussed in Part III.A, if we are inexperienced
relative to other countries on a matter of social policy, it is obtuse to
think that the Court should not look to how other countries have
dealt with a problem, and what kinds of impact others' solutions have
had. The Supreme Court's discussion of the Dutch experience with
euthanasia in Washington v. Glucksberg 76 is obviously appropriate for
this reason. This kind of borrowing, however, does not work very well
for something like understanding the meaning of "cruel and unusual," as the clause calls for a moral inquiry 177 and
not merely an in8
17
quiry as to the policy impact of a given legal rule.

176 521 U.S. 702, 734-35 (1997).
177

Accepting this view of the Eighth Amendment need not commit one to Ronald

Dworkin's constitutional theory or philosophy of law. Compare RONALD DWORKIN, TAK.
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 135-36 (1978) ("lit seems obvious that we must take what I
have been calling 'vague' constitutional clauses as representing appeals to the concepts
they employ, like legality, equality, and cruelty. The Supreme Court may soon decide,
for example, whether capital punishment is 'cruel' within the meaning of the constitutional clause that prohibits 'cruel and unusual punishment.' ... [T he ... question the
Court... faces.., is this: Can the Court, responding to the framers' appeal to the
concept of cruelty, now defend a conception that does not make death cruel?"), with
Joseph Raz, Dworkin: A New Link in the Chain, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (1986) (reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)) ("Dworkin's point here is
sound .... The framers of the Constitution intended to proscribe cruel and unusual
punishment.... To put the point in a way that Dworkin does not, but which I find
most congenial, the Constitution, by deploying many broad moral categories, gives discretion to the courts and directs them to use it in light of the true, or the best, moral
understanding of what is cruel, etc."), and id. at 1115 ("[H.L.A.] Hart's position is that
courts should follow the law and have discretion when the law does not determine a
uniquely correct outcome in the case before them. When the law does not directly incorporate moral precepts (e.g., by abolishing the death penalty) but endorses their
application by reference to them through the enactment of very general standards
('cruel and unusual punishment'), then it grants courts discretion to apply moral considerations to the case.").
178 Indeed, the common belief that the Eighth Amendment
implicates moral questions is precisely what makes the foreign law debate so controversial in this context.
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Second, the discussion about the significance of aesthetic consensus shows a way in which consensus can prompt one to enter into a
dialogue to attain a deeper understanding of the relevant evaluative
criteria. But this model requires the Court to engage in reasoncentric analyses, which the current Court may not be willing to undertake on a regular basis, as discussed in Part IV.
Or, as the discussion in Part III.D about the hypothetical "Dignity
Society" illustrated, the Court may look around the world and consider emulating only the countries with values similar to ours and distancing ourselves from those countries with whom we would rather
not be identified. As discussed in Part III.D, this model, too, is an
awkward fit with how the Court treats Eighth Amendment cases, as the
Court's emphasis in cases such as Roper, Atkins, and Coker has been not
that those who share values common to ours have reached a conclusion contrary to ours, but that there is an "overwhelming" consensus
against certain penal practices among countries with different moral,
cultural, and religious backgrounds. This is not to say that this type of
thinking-"We are like these countries, and we are unlike those countries"-is entirely absent. Witness, for instance, ChiefJustice Burger's
invocation of "the history of Western civilization" and 'Judeo-Christian
moral and ethical standards" in his notorious concurring opinion in
Bowers v. Hardwick.79 At the same time, the Court of late has seemed
reluctant to engage in such a discussion about U.S. culture and its
particular ethical tradition; such reluctance no doubt stems at least
partly from the same reasons that have driven the Court away from
reason-centric analyses. '80
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
should be noted that Justice Stevens, writing in Thompson v. Oklahoma, does
refer to the view of "nations that share our Anglo-American heritage." 487 U.S. 815,
830 (1988). However, he muddles the significance of the shared heritage when he also
mentions the views of "the leading members of the Western European Community":
"West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries" as well as "Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland," and "the Soviet Union." Id. at
830-31. Perhaps in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court employed the
type of reasoning that involves dividing the world into those who are like us and those
who are not, through the discussion of our "Western civilization." Id. at 572. However,
the discussion in Lawrence, too, is a bit obscure, as it is framed as responding to Chief
Justice Burger's "sweeping references.., to the history of Western civilization and to
Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards," and not as a freestanding discussion of
what it means to be part of Western civilization. Id. at 571-73. Finally, when the Roper
Court discussed England, it noted that "[t]he United Kingdom's experience bears particular relevance here in light of the historic ties between our countries and in light of
the Eighth Amendment's own origins." Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005).
How we should understand and evaluate the claim of "particular relevance" is, how179

180It

20071
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Finally, as the slavery example in Part III.D illustrates, the Court
may look for universal consensus on a moral question to find moral
propositions that appear to hold universally, such as: "Slavery is immoral," "Unjustified killing is immoral," "One should not be blamed
for something for which one is not responsible," or 'Juvenile offenders are less culpable than adult offenders." However, as discussed in
Part III.D, it is one thing to subscribe to the general proposition that
'juvenile offenders are less culpable than adult offenders"; it is quite
another to translate such a general proposition to a concrete legal decision such as the holding in Roper. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause may incorporate a universal moral principle, butjudicial
enforcement of the clause must include not only purely moral considerations but also more fact-specific, pragmatic considerations on how
best to implement a general moral principle.
Of course, as the Introduction made clear, this Article is about
foreign legal materials as persuasive authority. This Article has not addressed the merits of the argument that foreign authority can be binding or constitutive in deciding what is "cruel or unusual" in interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. In the current
foreign law debate, an important school of thought has emerged, and
the school of thought, which may be called the "International Constitution School," defends the practice of citing foreign sources not just
on the basis that they can serve as persuasive authority, but on the basis that we should start treating them as binding or constitutive.""
This school of thought questions whether a strict separation between
domestic and foreign laws is descriptively realistic or normatively desirable and sees the boundary between the two to be flexible, fluid,
permeable, dynamic, and constantly shifting. The School stresses the

ever, left unclear, as the Court quickly reverts back to the language of an international
consensus.
I have in mind, see Cleveland, supra note 3;
181 For some examples of what
Flaherty, supra note 12; Koh, supra note 12; Slaughter, supra note 14. The titles of
these articles-"Our International Constitution," "Separation of Powers in a Global
Context," "International Law As Part of Our Law," and "Judicial Globalization'"-are
good indicators of the general worldview of this school of thought. See also Harold
Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 1085, 1105-09, 1123-29 (2002) (discussing the relationship between the contin
ued existence of the death penalty in the United States and its foreign policy efforts).
But see Larsen, supra note 12, at 1318 ("[I]t is not clear by what authority the federal
courts are licensed to rehabilitate the foreign policy of the United States. Foreign policy decisions have always been understood to be the domain of the political branches,
and matters of foreign affairs are traditionally questions in which the courts are reluctant to intervene.") (footnote omitted).
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inherent benefits-and also the inevitability-of the increasing globalization of judicial thinking. The benefits of such dialogues are not
simply limited to the possibility of "us" learning from "them" about
"us." Rather, the very distinction between "us" and "them" is challenged.
Because the focus of this Article is on the question of the persuasiveness of foreign legal materials, the model this Article has assumed
looks overseas only in order to come to a better understanding of our
own Constitution. The idea is to improve our laws by learning from
others. The International School would not necessarily object to that,
but there is a subtle shift in emphasis in their work, which is that we
look overseas not because other countries' laws will help us to understand our own constitutional norms, but because laws from elsewhere
are (and, some would argue, have always been) part of our law in certain circumstances, and because there is sometimes a value in harmonizing our constitutional norms with prevailing international norms.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to normatively evaluate this
school of thought, as the purpose of this Article has been limited to
raising doubts about one common argument in this debate that may
appear beyond dispute: that the Court's current practice of citation
of foreign laws can be justified on the grounds that foreign laws are
persuasive or instructive in helping us think through our own constitutional issues.

